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Public Pension Reform and the
Contract Clause: A Constitutional
Protection for Rhode Island’s
Sacrificial Economic Lamb
William C. Burnham*

Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
So do our minutes hasten to their end,
Each changing place with that which goes before,
In sequent toil all forwards do contend.
Nativity, once in the main of light,
Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crowned,
Crooked eclipses ‘gainst his glory fight,
And time that gave doth now his gift confound.
Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth
And delves the parallels in beauty’s brow;
Feeds on the rarities of nature’s truth,
And nothing stands but for his scythe to mow.
And yet to times in hope my verse shall stand,
* J.D. Candidate, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2016; B.A.,
University of Delaware, 2012. For my father, Dr. Peter F. Burnham, who
taught me that while walking the path of a dedicated public servant is
remarkably treacherous, it is also uniquely fulfilling. Thank you to V ictoria
Burnham, David Burnham, and Mary Dzidual for their continued love and
support. Thank you to the entire Board and Staff of the Roger Williams
University Law Review, particularly Matthew Provencher for his guidance
and patience.
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Praising thy worth, despite his cruel hand.1
-William Shakespeare
“Pacta sunct servada”—agreements must be kept—
encompasses a familiar concept most of us are taught at
childhood, but also pervades bedrock principles of civil law. As
Americans, one could confidently say the importance of equity,
fairness, and obligation is woven into the very fabric of our society.
These fundamental concepts are indeed expressed by the most
sacred document in American society—the United States
Constitution. The federal “Contract Clause” contained in Article
One, Section Ten of the United States Constitution declares that
“[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.”2 Individual states likewise adopted the same or
similar provisions in their respective constitutions to extend this
safeguard against legislative interference with contracts on both
the federal and state levels. 3 To what degree is this seemingly
clear prohibition enforced? Can a state legally impair contractual
obligations, even when it is a party to a contract and owes
significant obligations itself? The Contract Clause serves as a
necessary check to ensure that state legislatures functionally
comply with core principles of fairness and obligation.
This Comment will explore the Contract Clause as it relates
to the Rhode Island Retirement Security Act (“RIRSA”). 4 RIRSA
is a landmark piece of state legislation, intended to overhaul the
ailing and grossly underfunded public pension system in the state
of Rhode Island. It consists of three primary legislative actions:
(1) it changes state employee public pension plans from defined
benefit plans to “hybrid” defined contribution plans; (2) it
indefinitely suspends and permanently reduces cost-of-living
adjustments (“COLAs”); and (3) increases the retirement age.
These alterations to Rhode Island’s public pension system come at
the expense of a significant negative impact on current and retired
1. William Shakespeare, Sonnet 60, in S HAKESPEARE ’S S ONNETS 69, 69
(Waiheke Island: The Floating Press 2009).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
3. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (“No . . . law impairing the
obligation of contracts, shall be passed.”).
4. See generally 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408. For the text of the relevant
bills establishing this legislation, see generally H.B. 6319, 2011 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2011); S.B. 1111, 2011 S., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2011).
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state employees. RIRSA infringes on a wide variety of contractual
rights. Perhaps even more importantly, the sweeping breadth and
long reformatory arm of RIRSA represents a high-water mark for
state public pension reform legislation nationwide. 5 If RIRSA can
withstand constitutional challenges, many other states will
implement elements of RIRSA in some capacity to attempt to
alleviate the burdensome debt of their own underfunded pension
systems. The potential impact of this legislation cannot not be
overstated. RIRSA will have a tremendous impact in Rhode
Island and is likely to reverberate throughout the country in the
coming years.6
Section I of this Comment details the general background
facts surrounding the passage of RIRSA, with subsections
dedicated to the notable substantive changes prescribed by the
Act.7 Section II will describe the analytic formula implemented by
the Supreme Court of the United States and later adopted by
Rhode Island courts for the purposes of evaluating a Contract
Clause challenge. Subsections will further describe each prong of
that test and the nuances and considerations behind each prong of
the inquiry.8 Section III begins by briefly surveying the challenge

5. See John J. Chung, Twenty Years of Impact: The Role of Roger
Williams University School of Law’s Alumni in Rhode Island Legal History,
19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. R EV . 679, 700–02 (2014).
6. See Stuart Buck, The Legal Ramifications of Public Pension Reform,
17 TEX. REV . L. & POL. 25, 27–28, 31–32, 71–75, 77–80, 87–90 (2012) (using
RIRSA as part of a multi-state case study of pension reform legislation and
acknowledging elements of RIRSA as a potentially viable model for other
states to follow, notwithstanding constitutionality of each element); Chung,
supra note 5, at 701; Honor Moore, The Public Pension Problem, 21 ELDER
L.J. 249, 253 (2014) (“[E]valuating Rhode Island’s pension reform and legal
challenges can provide insight into how Illinois, and other states ’ pension
reforms, will be challenged and how they will fare in court.”).
7. See discussion infra Part I.A (examining the implementation of a
“hybrid” public pension system in lieu of the existing traditional “defined
benefit” plan); Part I.B (exploring the cost-of-living-adjustment (“COLA”)
suspension and permanent reduction); Part I.C (discussing the increase in
retirement age).
8. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing whether the state law, in
fact, substantially impairs a contractual relationship); Part II.B (discussing
whether the state can show a legitimate public purpose behind the
regulation); Part II.C (discussing whether the modification of the rights and
responsibilities of the parties to the contract is nonetheless reasonable and
necessary in light of the public purpose).
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to RIRSA currently pending in the Rhode Island Superior Court, 9
and moves on to an application of all the elements of a Contract
Clause challenge to RIRSA de novo. Section IV concludes the
analysis and finds that RIRSA, as it was enacted, cannot survive a
Contract Clause challenge and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
I.

RHODE ISLAND’S PUBLIC PENSION REFORM AND THE SUBSTANCE OF
RIRSA

At the time RIRSA was passed in 2011, Rhode Island was
amid a period of economic decline so bleak that it prompted one
commentator to hyperbolically characterize the state as “an
American Greece.”10 To many Rhode Islanders, the widespread
media coverage of the unstable economic conditions in Rhode
Island was “almost too ubiquitous to warrant repeating,”11 but a
brief review is necessary for the purposes of context. The
American economy suffered greatly over a period of time between
approximately 2008 and 2009 which has been colloquially coined
“The Great Recession.”12 While every state felt the ripple effect of
the economic stagnation and decline, few were as dramatically
impacted as Rhode Island. 13 The Ocean State suffered from a
9. As of this writing, the litigation remains pending, although
settlement negotiations between the state and the union plaint iffs are
ongoing. A majority of the plaintiffs have voted to settle, but some claims
have yet to be resolved. See Tom Mooney & Katherine Gregg, ‘An awesome
achievement:’
Williams announces pension deal with public employees,
PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 2, 2015, 5:54 PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/
article/20150402/NEWS/150409837/13943.
10. See David V on Drehle, The Little State That Could, TIME, Dec. 5,
2011, at, 30, 32, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/
pdf/cbl/Rhode_Island_Materials.pdf.
11. Andre S. Digou, A View of the Rhode Island Pension Landscape: The
Potential Reform of Local Pension Plans Under the Preemption Doctrine, 19
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV . 740, 746 (2014).
12. See, e.g., Ben Stevermen, The Great Recession Put Us in a Hole. Are
We Out Yet?, BLOOMBERG BUS . (Oct. 27, 2014, 10:29 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-27/the-great-recession-put-us-in-ahole-are-we-out-yet-.html; see also The Recession of 2007–2009, U.S. B UREAU
OF LAB. S TAT. (Feb. 2012), http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/.
13. See ANTHONY RANDAZZO, PENSION R EFORM C ASE S TUDY: R HODE
ISLAND, POLICY S TUDY 428, 1, 8–10 (2014), available at http://
reason.org/files/pension_reform_rhode_island.pdf; V on Drehle, supra note 10,
at 32, 34; Mary Williams Walsh, The Little State with a Big Mess, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/business/for-rhodeisland-the-pension-crisis-is-now.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all.
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wide array of internal and external financial issues that were
greatly exacerbated by this economic event.14 Joblessness in the
state climbed to ten and three-fifths percent, compared to the 2011
national average of nine and one-tenth.15 Textile and jewelry
manufacturing in the state had largely dried up, and the majority
of employers in the nation’s smallest state—healthcare and
education—were, and still are, largely dependent on government
spending.16
It was amid this economically vulnerable period that many
states, including Rhode Island, decided that much of the internal
state debt could be alleviated or mitigated by reforming the public
pension system.17 Rhode Island’s public pension system suffered
from years of failed investment gambles and general neglect by
the executive and legislative branches. 18 The well documented
“decades of drift, denial, and inaction” by the Rhode Island
government had rendered the state’s $14.8 billion pension system
extremely inefficient and vulnerable. 19 In 2011, ten cents of every
tax dollar went toward maintaining the grossly neglected pension
system.20 Gina Raimondo—then the face of Rhode Island’s
pension reform movement in her capacity as then General
Treasurer and now Governor of the State—contributed to the
tension in the state between wary tax payers and loyal public
employees by agreeing with the sentiment that the public
employees “have an unbelievably rich Cadillac plan” that needed
to be scaled back.21 While piecemeal legislation was put in place
14.
15.
16.
17.

See Walsh, supra note 13.
Id.
See id.
See AMY M ONAHAN, AM . ENTER. INST., UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL
LIMITS ON PUBLIC PENSION REFORM at 4–7 (2013), available at
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/-understanding-the-legal-limi
ts-on-public-pension-reform_104816268458.pdf; Buck, supra note 6, at 27–28.
18. See V on Drehle, supra note 10, at 32; Walsh, supra note 13.
19. Walsh, supra note 13; see also RANDAZZO, supra note 13, at 6.
20. Walsh, supra note 13.
21. Mike Stanton, General Treasurer Gina Raimondo wants long-term
solution to underfunded pension system, PROVIDENCE J. (Apr. 9, 2011, 12:01
AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20110409/BUSINESS/30409
9999/0/SEARCH. But see ROBERT HILTONSMITH, ECON. POL’Y INST., R HODE
ISLAND’S NEW HYBRID PENSION PLAN WILL C OST THE S TATE M ORE WHILE
REDUCING R ETIREE BENEFITS (2013), available at http://www.epi.org/
publication/ib366-rhode-islands-hybrid-pension-plan/ (characterizing the
public pension system in Rhode Island prior to RIRSA’s reforms as “not
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to attempt to alter the system in some way, Rhode Island took
“unprecedented” steps to totally warp the public pension system in
the state with the introduction of RIRSA. 22
It was amid this tumultuous backdrop of economic
uncertainty that RIRSA was passed.
Although RIRSA
encountered strong criticism from the general public, the General
Assembly nevertheless passed the reform bill in 2011. 23 Now
applauded by parties who likewise wish to dramatically reduce the
state government’s financial obligations to the state public
pension system, RIRSA represents the high-water mark for state
pension reform.24
As a practical matter, it is worth noting at this point that
state pension program implementation and interpretation are
regulated and maintained by the states themselves, rather than
the federal government. 25 As such, the legal status of public
pensions varies from state to state.26 Although historically seen
as gratuities from the government, the states have almost
uniformly rejected that theory in lieu of “contract” or “property”
theories, which view public pensions as contractually protected
promises from the government or property rights, respectively. 27
Rhode Island has adopted a form of the contractual theory of
public pensions.28 Although this puts Rhode Island in the
majority, different interpretations and applications of the
Contract Clause and its analytic test create scattered and often
unpredictable results regarding issues of precisely when an
particularly generous” compared to the majority of other states).
22. M ONIQUE M ORRISSEY, ECON. POL’Y INST., TRUTH IN NUMBERS ? A BRIEF
HISTORY OF C UTS TO THE EMPLOYEES ’ RETIREMENT S YSTEM OF RHODE ISLAND 1,
6–8 (2013), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/bp363-brief-history-ofcuts-to-the-employees-retirement-system-of-rhode-island/.
23. See Walsh, supra note 13.
24. See M ONAHAN, supra note 17, at 7; M ORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 1, 7.
25. See Amy Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal
Framework, 5 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 617, 626 (2010).
26. See Moore, supra note 6, at 266.
27. See Terry A. M. Mumford & Mary Leto Pareja, The Employer’s
(In)ability to Reduce Retirement Benefits in the Public Sector, ALI-ABA
COURSE S TUDY, Sept. 11, 1997, at 34–36, 38–49, available at WESTLAW,
SC14 ALI-ABA 27.
28. See id. at 37; see also Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No.
PC 12-3168, 2014 WL 1743142, at *15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014)
(acknowledging that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has adopted a middleground approach between pure contract models and a gratuity model).
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employee has a vested contractual right in their retirement
benefits.29 To appreciate the sweeping breadth of this legislation,
one must first look at some of the most dramatic alterations
implemented by RIRSA. The next Sections will briefly explain the
nature, function, and effect of RIRSA’s most controversial
elements.
A. Transformation of the Retirement System from the Existing
Traditional “Defined Benefit Plan” to a Unique “Hybrid Plan”30
Traditionally, retirement benefit systems are categorized into
two distinct categories: defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans. Generally speaking, defined benefit plans are
associated with public or “government” retirement systems, while
defined contribution plans have recently been almost exclusively
associated with private retirement systems that fall under the
broad aegis of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”). 31 The differences between these two types of
pension structures are crucial to the expectations and actual
benefits enjoyed by the employee. 32
Simplistically, in a defined benefit structure, the employer
bears the burden “to contribute funds to the pension plan on an
actuarially sound basis so that sufficient funds exist to pay the
worker when he or she retires.”33 This places the market risks on
the employer to “invest enough in the present to fund the ongoing
pension expenses that largely involve pension payments to current
retirees.”34 “The minimum funding of a defined benefit plan is
29. Some states (e.g., California) have held that pension benefits vest at
the beginning of employment, while other states have held that no benefit
has vested until the end of employment. See infra notes 172–75. While
Rhode Island seems to fall into a more flexible category somewhere in
between these two extremes, the issue of contractual vesting greatly
complicates the following issues. However, a full discussion of the various
subsets of plaintiffs in this case and their unique vesting provisions is outside
the scope of this Comment and will not be discussed at great length. For a
more comprehensive discussion of vesting issues in pension reform across the
country, see Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 39–40.
30. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-10.3-1 to -12 (2012).
31. See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contract Clause Challenges in
Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 263, 267–68 (2011).
32. See id. at 268–69.
33. Id. at 268.
34. Id. at 268–69.
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calculated based on a complex actuarial analysis revolving around
factors such as age, length of service, projected future salary
increases, and rate of return on plan investments.”35 In essence,
defined contribution plans are generally more desirable for the
majority of employees because the majority of the financial risk
and investment burdens are borne by the employer as opposed to
a potentially financially illiterate, disinterested, or otherwise
insufficiently sophisticated employee. 36
By contrast, defined contribution plans shift this economic
liability from the employer to the employee. The employer will
provide a menu of investment options for the employee and may or
may not match the employee’s salary contribution to the fund,
thereby usually ending any further obligation to provide funding
to the pension.37 Under this structure, the employee bears all
respective risks including: “risk of longevity[,] risk of investment
return[,] and risk on inflation.”38 The benefit of such a system, of
course, is the portability of a consumer-driven system that allows
employees to have more control over their pensions. 39 However,
the policy argument evaluating the comparative advantages and
disadvantages between defined contribution and defined benefit
structures has largely been enclosed to the ERISA-governed
private-sector.40
Perhaps the most noticeable element of RIRSA is the
abandonment of a pure traditional defined benefit structure in
lieu of a “hybrid” structure that establishes a defined contribution
fund, which ideally operates in tandem with the existing defined
benefit plan that has been in place. 41 Under RIRSA, public
employees retain all benefits accrued as of June 30, 2012, but
35. Id. at 269.
36. See id. at 268–69.
37. See id. at 269. To further illustrate this point, consider a standard
401(k) retirement plan. A 401(k) is a basic defined contribution retirement
plan. Employees have a defined contribution amount that they contribute to
the plan, which may be matched by an employer. It differs from a defined
benefit plan in that employees have no guaranteed income from a 401(k) or
defined contribution plan. The performance of their retirement accounts is
subject to the market performance of the investments in the plan and, thus,
is not guaranteed.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 269–70.
41. See RANDAZZO, supra note 13, at 18–19.
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after that date, the employees are enrolled in a mandatory system
that retains vestiges of the previous defined benefit plan; but the
new plan also compels employees to participate in a mandatory
defined contribution fund.42 Under this plan, “each participant
contributes 8.75% of their base pay, of which 3.75% is contributed
to the [defined benefit] and 5% is contributed to the [defined
contribution] plan.”43 “The state (or municipality responsible) also
contributes 1% to the participant’s [defined contribution] plan.”44
This keeps the contribution rates for public employees at the same
rate (eight and three-fourths percent), but puts more than half of
this contribution (five percent) in a defined contribution plan. 45
While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to fully evaluate
the benefits and burdens of a defined contribution plan as opposed
to a defined benefit plan, the fact of the matter is that this shift to
a partial defined contribution plan has been perceived as highly
controversial.46 Employees who enter the public-sector in Rhode
Island expect to have a defined benefit plan rather than a defined
contribution plan or some amalgamation of both. Moreover, the
innate market risks are largely shifted from the state employer to
public employee. This was a major issue of contention in the past
RIRSA litigation.47
B. “Cost-of-Living Adjustment” Suspension & Permanent
Reduction 48
COLAs are a dynamic part of public pension systems.
According to a National Association of State Retirement
Administrators (“NASRA”) issue brief, the general purpose of
42. See id.; Digou, supra note 11, at 750–52.
43. Digou, supra note 11, at 750.
44. Id.; see also Jack M. Beermann, Resolving the Public Pension
“Crisis,” 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1004–06 (2014) (pointing to the means to
avoid contributory obligations that are unavailable to states, but are
available to municipalities, namely: bankruptcy and the issuance of bonds);
Christopher D. Hu, Note, Reforming Public Pensions In Rhode Island, 23
S TAN. L. & POL’Y REV . 523, 524, 529 (2012) (introducing the obligation
imposed on municipalities to develop their own pension systems as a major
element of RIRSA).
45. HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 4.
46. See HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 1–6; Hu, supra note 44, at 528.
47. See, e.g., HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 1–6; R ANDAZZO, supra note
13, at 18; Secunda, supra note 31, at 268–71; Hu, supra note 44, at 528.
48. See R.I. GEN. LAW § 36-10-35 (2014).
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COLAs are to “offset or reduce effects of inflation on retirement
income” in an apparent effort to keep the retiree’s spending power
relatively consistent over time. 49 As the rate of inflation is
adjustable depending on a variety of factors, presumably so too is
the COLA. However, it is worth noting the basic principle that
inflation constantly increases the cost of goods and services in the
economy; thus, with most COLAs the adjustment percentage
generally increases in order to protect a retiree’s spending power.
One of RIRSA’s key provisions suspends and reduces COLAs. 50
In the “Legislative Intent and Findings” section of RIRSA, the
legislature states that “[t]he vast majority of unfunded liability for
[the public pension system] is attributable to service rendered by
employees who have already retired, and a very significant portion
of this unfunded liability is represented by future cost of living
adjustments (COLAs).”51 Accordingly, the legislature warned that
“it is essential that the COLA benefits for retirees be impacted as
part of this comprehensive reform of the retirement system.”52
Although going forward the reader is presumably braced for an
impact on COLA benefits, the substance of the COLA reductions
are still remarkably ambitious.
Most notably, RIRSA suspends annual COLAs for retired
state employees for an indeterminate amount of time. 53
Specifically, the retirees will not be entitled to COLAs under
RIRSA until their individual pension plan is eighty percent
funded overall.54 Filling these coffers will be no easy task given
the gross underfunding that provoked RIRSA. At the time the
49. NASRA, COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS 1 (2014), available at
http://www.nasra.org/content.asp?contentid=125.
50. R.I. GEN. LAW § 36-10-35 (2014). See also Buck, supra note 6, at 71–
73 (citing various cases in which courts had previously struck down efforts to
reduce COLAs). But see Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 205, 212–13 (Colo.
2014). In Justus v. State, the court held that a Contract Clause challenge to
a Colorado pension reform provision, which decreased COLA percentages
from a fixed three-and-a-half percent rate to a formulaic calculation that was
capped at two percent, failed because the plaintiffs did not establish that
there was, in fact, a contractual relationship between the government and
the employees. Id. The court relied on the fact that the legislature
frequently altered the COLA percentages and, thus, made no clear indication
that they intended the relationship to be contractually binding in nature. Id.
51. 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 1 (a)(10).
52. Id.
53. See Hu, supra note 44, at 527.
54. See id.

BURNHAMFINAL EDITW OR D. DOC X (D O N OT D ELETE)

5/19/2015 1:19 PM

2015]RHODE ISLAND’S SACRIFICIAL ECONOMIC LAMB 533
legislation was passed, the pension plans were only forty-eight
percent funded.55 The concerns surrounding the eighty percent
mark are exacerbated when one considers the unpredictability of
financial returns on Rhode Island’s aggressive hedge fund
investments of public pension money. 56 It is estimated that it will
take at least sixteen years for the pension system to be eighty
percent funded.57 This means that retired state employees will
not receive a substantial adjustment in their benefits, regardless
of how expensive living becomes, for more than a decade and a
half, at best.
Retirees are, however, entitled to an “interim” COLA once
every five years, but the calculation of this COLA “is capped at 4%
and applied only to the retiree’s first $25,000 of pension income.” 58
Even if the pension system is eventually eighty percent funded,
this same capped formula will continue to apply going forward. 59
Thus, this element of RIRSA also represents a permanent
reduction to the COLA benefits for new employees, current
employees, and even current retirees. 60 The net effect of the
provision is to calculate an adjustment on the basis of only a
percentage of a retiree’s pension income, rather than the full
amount—decreasing the effect of the adjustment and leaving large
portions of income subject to inflation. Even with the limited
interim payment, most retirees will not be able to rely on a COLA

55. See id.
56. See David Sirota, Rhode Island Has Lost $372 Million As State
Shifted Pension Cash to Wall Street, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014, 1:34
PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/rhode-island-has-lost-372-million-state-shiftedpension-cash-wall-street-1671790.
57. See, e.g., Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168,
2014 WL 1743142, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014).
58. Hu, supra note 44, at 527. Outside of the four percent cap, this is
also substantively different in the sense that, originally, this was out of the
first $35,000. According to some reports, the final settlement offer from the
State contained concessions at this point of contention between the parties in
the RIRSA lawsuit. See Rhode Island’s Landmark Pension Reform Could Be
Adjusted Under Proposed Settlement Agreement, CIVIC FEDERATION (April 4,
2014, 10:27 AM), http://www.civicfed.org/iifs/blog/rhode-island%E2%80%99slandmark-pension-reforms-could-be-adjusted-under-proposed-settlementagreem.
59. See id. at 527 n.31.
60. See Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *5–6;
Chung, supra note 5, at 704.
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to combat the effects of inflation.61 Additionally, this provision is
a permanent reduction to COLA benefits for future retirees. 62
C.

Retirement Age Increase63

RIRSA increases the eligible minimum retirement age for
almost all public employees. 64 Changes to employee retirement
plans raise substantial fairness concerns on the basis of an
employee’s reliance on a set retirement scheme. 65 RIRSA does
mitigate this concern to some degree by raising the retirement age
in a way that is prorated based on previous years of service. 66 An
additional concern is that increasing “the retirement age during
one’s working life inherently reduces the present value of all past
accruals, because that present value would have to have been
calculated by discounting for a longer period.”67
In terms of prorating the retirement age to avoid situations of
obvious unfairness, RIRSA eliminates the possibility that an
employee will be forced to work extra years on the eve of her
retirement by excluding employees who were already eligible to
retire as of July 1, 2012—the day the law took effect—from the
retirement age increase.68 For any employee with less than five
years of service on June 30, 2012, RIRSA automatically increases
the retirement age to the Social Security retirement age, changing
the eligible age for retirement from sixty-two to sixty-seven.69 For
61. See Hu, supra note 44, at 527.
62. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-35 (Supp. 2014); see also Chung, supra note 5,
at 704.
63. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 36-10-9 to -10 (2011 & Supp. 2014).
64. Id.; see also Moore, supra note 6, at 270; Hu, supra note 44, at 524.
65. See Buck, supra note 6, at 77.
66. See id. at 78.
67. See id. at 79. Buck provides an example to further illustrate this
concern:
[I]f I am thirty-five and now have to work to age [sixty-seven] rather
than age sixty-two, the then-present value of what I earned at age
twenty-five, twenty-six, twenty-seven, etc., would all have been
determined by discounting back from age [sixty-seven] rather than
sixty-two, and with any discount rate above zero, that will
automatically make the present value of those accruals lower.
Id. This can be thought of as retroactively reducing the present value of
previous accruals. See id.
68. See id. at 78.
69. Id. Buck argues that this increase is reasonable because younger
employees presumably “do not yet have a substantial interest in retiring at
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in-between employees who, at the time RIRSA takes effect, have
five years or more of service in the public-sector—or are otherwise
eligible for retirement at the original age of sixty-two—the
retirement age is calculated by “adjust[ing] downward in
proportion to the amount of service the member has earned as of
June 30, 2012.”70 “In other words, the formula in Rhode Island
now prorates any increase in retirement age in inverse proportion
to how many years the employee had already worked toward the
previous retirement age.”71
II. CONTRACT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

Rhode Island’s constitution states that “[n]o . . . law impairing
the obligation of contracts, shall be passed.”72 This language
mirrors the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. 73
As such, the tests adopted by the United States Supreme Court for
Contract Clause challenges have been substantially followed by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 74 Although the test to be
applied in a Contract Clause challenge differs depending upon the
character of the contract in question, RIRSA affects solely public
contracts between state employees and the state itself; this
analysis proceeds under the test governing public-sector
contracts.75
The state constitution of Rhode Island and its
interpretations in state court are the only binding forms of
authority relied on throughout this Comment. 76
some earlier age.” Id. Note that the normal retirement age was sixty-five
after ten years of service and sixty-two after twenty-nine years of service.
See HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 3.
70. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-9(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2014). See also Buck, supra
note 6, at 78 (providing two examples of how this calculation operates).
71. Buck, supra note 6, at 79.
72. R.I. CONST. art 1, § 12.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .”).
74. See, e.g., R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., 716
A.2d 730, 736 (R.I. 1998); R.I. Depositors Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 106
(R.I. 1995).
75. Note that the ultimate purpose of this Comment is to address
RIRSA’s infringement on the contract between the public employees and the
State. Therefore, there will be an increased focus on alleged contracts in
which the government is a party as opposed to legislative infringement of
private contracts. However, much of the analysis is similar between these
two categories of contracts, so this distinction will not be exclusive.
76. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 25, at 620. It is worth noting that
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The test consists of a three pronged inquiry: (1) whether the
state law in question substantially impairs a contractual
relationship (“Prong I” or “first prong”); 77 if so, (2) whether the
state can show a legitimate public purpose behind the regulation
(“Prong II” or “second prong”); 78 and, (3) whether the modification
of the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the contract is
nonetheless reasonable and necessary in light of the public
purpose (“Prong III” or “third prong”). 79 This test can be
understood as a series of “hurdles” for the parties to clear. The
“height” of each hurdle varies depending on the nature of the
contract that a law substantially impairs—different tests are
prescribed for private and public contracts. 80
The distinction between private and public contracts81 is
Rhode Island’s largest public employee union approved a pension settlement
plan on March 27, 2015. See Katherine Gregg, R.I.’s largest public employee
union approves pension settlement plan, PROVIDENCE J. (Mar. 27, 2015, 3:37
PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20150327/NEWS/150329314.
77. E.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S.
400, 411 (1983); R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 716 A.2d at 736. Note that
many contemporary Contract Clause challenges falter at this stage. See, e.g.,
R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 716 A.2d at 736.
78. E.g., R.I. Depositors Corp., 659 A.2d at 106.
79. E.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977).
Note that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has framed the Contract
Clause test in the following way:
A court first must determine whether a contract exists. If a contract
exists, the court then must determine whether the modification
results in an impairment of that contract and, if so, whether this
impairment can be characterized as substantial. Finally, if it is
determined that the impairment is substantial, the court then must
inquire whether the impairment, nonetheless, is reasonable and
necessary to fulfill an important public purpose.
Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1202 (R.I. 1999) (citations
omitted). Despite the structural difference, the Rhode Island Contract
Clause test operates in the same fashion as the Supreme Court Contract
Clause test.
80. Compare R.I. Insurers’ Insolvency Fund, 716 A.2d at 736–37
(applying the Contract Clause test to a case of private contractual
impairment), with Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1202–04 (applying the
Contract Clause test to a case of public contractual impairment and, while
finding the law to be constitutional in the face of the Contract Clause, still
promulgating a different test to be applied to public contracts ).
81. For the sake of clarity, “private contracts” in this context refers to a
contract involving two independent private entities, and “public contracts” in
this context refers to contracts between the government and some other
entity, such as state employees.
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material in public pension reform laws, such as RIRSA, because
the government is a party to the public contract impaired by its
own passage of a law. 82 In cases of private contracts, the first
hurdle (Prong I) is relatively static and somewhat easy to
overcome for the plaintiff. 83 At Prongs II and III of the analysis,
however, the hurdles for the government—to articulate a
legitimate public purpose for the law and to justify the law as
“reasonable” in light of those public purposes—are similarly low
when private contracts are at issue as a result of judicial
deference to state legislatures.84 By contrast, with the publicsector contract analysis, the hurdles at Prongs II and III are
substantially higher for the government to surpass. The Supreme
Court explained this rule in United States Trust Co. of New York
v. New Jersey, stating that “complete deference to a legislative
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate
because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”85 Establishing the
existence of a contract, and substantial impairment of that
contract, is more difficult for plaintiffs because of the higher
judicial scrutiny public contracts receive when searching for both
existence and impairment. 86 As the First Circuit reasoned in
Parella v. Retirement Board of Rhode Island Employees’
Retirement System, this heightened burden is justified because the
existence of a public contractual obligation means that a
subsequent legislature is not free to significantly impair that
obligation for merely rational reasons. 87
It is also important to note that, despite the Contract Clause
test’s superficial similarity to rational basis review, it does not
apply that standard. Rational basis review inquires into whether
the means used by the government are rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. 88 The Contract Clause test asks
82. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26.
83. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 238 –
43 (1978).
84. See, e.g., id.
85. 431 U.S. at 26. See also Leo Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis for
Limited Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. M IAMI L. REV .
183, 194–98 (1985).
86. See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 60
(1st Cir. 1999) (citing Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488–
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whether a law’s means are reasonable and necessary to achieve a
legitimate government purpose. 89 Rational basis review makes no
inquiry into the reasonableness of a law’s means, only its
rationality. Likewise, rational basis review does not require a
law’s means be necessary, only that it rationally relates to the
purposes asserted. It appears clear that while Contract Clause
review does not rise to the exacting levels of scrutiny afforded in
intermediate and strict scrutiny, it is nonetheless a more
searching inquiry than rational basis review. 90
The language of the Contract Clause itself is deceptively
simple. The government cannot pass any law that impairs the
obligation of contracts.91 It is well settled, however, that the
language of the Contract Clause is not rigidly applied to all
impairments of contracts. The Supreme Court noted in Home
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell that “the prohibition is not an
absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula.”92
This has the effect of rendering
application of the Contract Clause problematic: outcomes are
dependent upon judicial interpretations of reasonableness, which
necessarily invite a great deal of subjective, context-sensitive
decision-making. This makes it difficult for parties challenging
legislation to overcome the initial hurdle of establishing that a law
substantially impairs a contractual relationship. 93 Additionally,
this also opens the door for the introduction of the ever-enigmatic
“police power” doctrine as a justification for invasive state
legislation.94 Before a court enters these murky, analytic waters,
however, a Contract Clause challenge must first satisfy the
baseline inquiries concerning the existence of a contract. The
following subsections will provide an overview of each prong of a
91 (1955).
89. Compare Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488–91, with U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y.,
431 U.S. at 20–29. See also Parella, 173 F.3d at 60.
90. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (utilizing the
strict scrutiny standard); United States v. V irginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(utilizing an intermediate scrutiny review).
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; R.I. C ONST. art. 1, § 12.
92. 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
93. See, e.g., Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1203–04
(R.I. 1999); Retired Adjunct Professors of R.I. v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342, 1347
(R.I. 1997).
94. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. N.Y., 431 U.S. at 21–24; Clarke, supra note
85, at 245–52.
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public Contract Clause analysis.
A. Has the State Law Substantially Impaired a Contractual
Relationship?
The first element of a Contract Clause challenge is the most
important and difficult element for a plaintiff to overcome. This
threshold inquiry establishes exactly whether a contract has been
impaired and to what degree.
It is, therefore, largely
determinative of the outcome of the case. In the case of public
pension reform, for example, there are diverse subsets of plaintiffs
with potentially very different contractual relationships with the
state depending on the time of service and nature of
employment.95 This step is essential in defining the scope of the
“obligation” owed to the impaired party. 96 As the First Circuit
noted:
Finding a public contractual obligation has considerable
effect. It means that a subsequent legislature is not free
to significantly impair that obligation for merely rational
reasons.
Because of this constraint on subsequent
legislatures, and thus on subsequent decisions by those
who represent the public, there is, for the purposes of the
Contract Clause, a higher burden to establish that a
contractual obligation has been created. 97
Although commentators criticize this rationale and it is not
universally binding, it underscores the general difficulties that
challengers alleging an unconstitutional violation of a public
contract will encounter at Prong I of a Contract Clause analysis. 98
This initial inquiry—has the state law, in fact, substantially
impaired a contractual relationship—is composed of at least three
sub-inquiries. The three sub-inquires of this element are: (a)
whether there is a contractual relationship; if so (b) whether a
change in the law impairs that contractual relationship; and (c)

95. See Buck, supra note 6, at 49–65.
96. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 600 (1877) (“The
obligation of a contract includes every thing within its obligatory scope.”).
97. Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 60 (1st Cir.
1999).
98. See Buck, supra note 6, at 51–52.
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whether that impairment is substantial. 99
i.

Whether There is a Contractual Relationship

In cases involving alleged government contracts, as opposed
to private contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States has
instructed lower courts to proceed cautiously in determining
whether a state intended to contractually bind itself by statute. 100
Specifically, courts have been instructed to look for a clear
indication that the legislature has intended to be bound. 101 Thus,
absent clear statutory language indicating intent on behalf of the
government to establish a contractual right, it is presumed that
the legislature merely made a law to establish a policy of the state
which, unlike a contract, is inherently subject to revision and
repeal.102 This rule of construction, generally referred to as “the
unmistakability doctrine,” has been said to “balance ‘the
Government’s need for freedom to legislate with its obligation to
honor its contracts.’”103 “[T]he government may not use these
doctrines simply ‘as a means to escape from contracts that it
subsequently concluded were unwise.’”104
Courts are not limited to only the literal text of the statute as
criteria for the purposes of determining the state’s intent to be
contractually bound.105 The reviewing court may use apparent
99. E.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992).
100. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
470 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1985).
101. Id.
102. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States elaborated on the
distinction between policies and contracts as follows:
This well-established presumption is grounded in the elementary
proposition that the principal function of a legislature is not to make
contracts, but to make laws that establish the policy of the state.
Policies, unlike contracts, are inherently subject to revision and
repeal, and to construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not
clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the
essential powers of the legislative body.
Id. (citation omitted).
103. R.I. Pub. Emps.’ Retiree Coal. v. Chafee, C.A. No. PC 12-3166, 2014
WL 1577496, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2014) (quoting Connor Bros.
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Geren, 550 F.3d 1368. 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
104. R.I. Council 94 v. Chafee, C.A. No. PC 12-3168, 2014 WL 1743149, at
*13 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014) (quoting Connor Bros. Constr., 550 F.3d at
1374).
105. See, e.g., R.I. Laborers’ Dist. Council, Local Union 808 v. Rhode
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purpose, context, legislative history, and any pertinent evidence to
discern the actual intent of the legislature. 106 As the United
States Supreme Court put it in United States Trust Co. of New
York, where the statute at issue is ambiguous, the reviewing court
looks to whether “the language and circumstances evince a
legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature
enforceable against the State.”107 Nevertheless, overcoming the
presumption that the government generally does not intend to
create a private contractual right has proven difficult, and often
fatal, for many Contract Clause claims. 108
ii. Whether a Change in the Law Impairs that Contractual
Relationship
Once a contractual relationship is recognized, the court then
engages in the process of evaluating the existence and extent of an
impairment on that contractual relationship. For this purpose of
determining an “impairment,” the total destruction of a
contractual obligation is not necessary. 109 Rather, “legislation
which deprives one of the benefit of a contract, or adds new duties
or obligations thereto, necessarily impairs the obligation of the
contract.”110 Additionally, “[l]egislation that reduces the value of

Island, 145 F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 1998). But see McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., By
& Through Mayer, 906 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D.R.I. 1995) (stating that the most
important indication of whether a statute constitutes a contractual offer is
the language of the statute itself), aff’d sub nom. McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1996).
106. See McGrath, 906 F. Supp. at 761–62; accord R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-107 (2007) (“Guarantee by State – Annual Appropriations: The general
assembly of the state of Rhode Island hereby declares that it is the intention
of the state to make payment of the annuities, benefits, and retirement
allowances provided for under the provisions of this chapter and to that end
that it is the intention of the state to make the appropriations required by the
state to meet its obligations to the extent provided in this chapter.”).
107. 431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977).
108. See, e.g., Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 208–09, 212–13 (Colo. 2014)
(finding no evidence granting COLA benefits to retirees in a Colorado statute
or in the legislative history of said statute that would be indicative of a “clear
indication” of the legislature’s intent to be bound to provide a fixed COLA to
members of a state retirement system throughout their retirement).
109. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400, 411 (1983).
110. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 208 U.S. 583, 591 (1908).
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a contract has also been found to be an impairment.”111 Generally
speaking, most courts tend to view any legislative modification of
a contractual right as an “impairment.”112
iii. Whether the Impairment is Substantial
Even if a plaintiff can show a contractual relationship, and
legislative impairment of that relationship, she must still
demonstrate that the impairment is requisitely “substantial” to
clear this initial hurdle of the Contract Clause test. 113 The
requisite “substantiality” of impairment that gives rise to a
Contract Clause challenge is by no means a clearly defined
standard. A review of judicial history reveals an inconsistent
evaluative methodology that, at times, borders on arbitrary. The
United States Supreme Court has provided very little guidance on
how courts should evaluate the substantiality of a contractual
impairment.114 For example, in the context of a private Contract
Clause analysis it stated:
The severity of an impairment of contractual obligations
can be measured by the factors that reflect the high value
the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts.
111. M ONAHAN, supra note 17, at 14 (citing Ret. Pub. Emps. of Wash. v.
Charles, 62 P.3d 470, 482 (Wash. 2003)).
112. It is of note that some federal district courts have attempted to
sharpen this point of the Contract Clause analysis in favor of the state. See,
e.g., St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 149–51 (1901); Univ. of
Hawai’i Prof’l Assemb. v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 1999);
Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir.
1996). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has articulated the stance that
a mere breach of contract is insufficient to garner constitutional protection.
Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1250. The court reasoned that “[i]t would be
absurd to turn every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a
violation of the Federal Constitution.” Id. If a court adopts this logic, “[t]he
crucial question becomes whether the plaintiffs . . . retain the right to recover
damages for the breach.” Secunda, supra note 31, at 286. However, in the
case of most public pension cases, “this threshold issue would not appear to
be an obstacle as plaintiffs could normally contend that they were barred
from recovering damages from the State as the result of the State’s
amendment of their pension plan.” Id. As such, it will not be addressed in
this Comment.
113. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 84–85 (1823) (holding that, although
changes to the terms of a contract, however minute, can impair the obligation
of contract, the objection that a statute impairs the obligation of contract does
not depend on the extent of the change which the law effect in it).
114. See M ONAHAN, supra note 17, at 8 n.9.
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Contracts enable individuals to order their personal and
business affairs according to their particular needs and
interests. Once arranged, those rights and obligations are
binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to rely
on them.115
The “substantial” element of a Contract Clause analysis
becomes even murkier in cases of public contracts. For example,
the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged from the
beginning that states may reserve the right to modify the terms of
a contract.116 Today, courts have recognized that a general
reservation of the right to modify is insufficient, however, “[i]f a
state explicitly reserves the right to modify benefit levels, any
subsequent modification may be considered an insubstantial
impairment.”117
Thus, courts often consider whether the
government in the past has regulated the industry that the
complaining party has entered. 118 If the court answers the
question in the affirmative, it usually will conclude that the
impairment has not risen to the necessary level of
substantiality.119 In sum, a law will substantially impair a public
contract when it alters an obligation that the government has
intended to bind itself to in a manner that affects the obligations
owed in a significant and meaningful manner. The nebulousness
of the inquiry into “substantiality” is problematic. If a court
determines that the alleged impairment is not substantial enough,
it will decline to further analyze the challenge, thereby ending the
inquiry and the lawsuit. Moreover, the degree of judicial scrutiny
exercised in the second and third prongs of the test is directly
linked to the extent of the impairment deduced in the first
prong.120 The severity of the impairment increases the level of
scrutiny to which the legislation will be subjected.121

115. Allied Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978). See also
M ONAHAN, supra note 17, at 8 n.9.
116. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 683
(1819) (Story, J., concurring).
117. Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 35 (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400, 411 (1983).
119. See, e.g., id. at 411–12.
120. See, e.g., id. at 411–13.
121. See, e.g., id. at 411–12.
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B. Can the State Show a Legitimate Public Purpose Behind the
Regulation?
If the complaining party can overcome the initial hurdle of
showing a substantial burden, the state must demonstrate a
legitimate public purpose behind the challenged legislation.
Articulating a legitimate public purpose is not a steep hurdle for
the state to clear. As the body of precedent on this concept in
constitutional law is sufficiently dense, this Comment will only
provide a cursory review of what constitutes a “legitimate public
purpose” in a Contract Clause challenge. 122
In 1827, Chief Justice Marshall first recognized the “police
power” of the states as a permissive basis for legislation. 123 Police
power has come to encompass the authority of the states “to
provide for the public health, safety, and morals.”124 This
umbrella of authority is intentionally broad, for among other
reasons, to solidify principles of federalism and state autonomy. 125
Moreover, since the New Deal, the judiciary has generally given
more deference to a state’s articulated “purpose” behind
legislation.126 So long as the legislation is not facially abusive, the
courts will generally recognize a purported government public
purpose as “legitimate.”127
For the purposes of a Contract Clause claim, it is difficult to
122. For a more complete discussion of state police powers, see generally
Legarre Santiago, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 745 (2007).
123. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S 419, 443–44 (1827).
124. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991).
125. See Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of
Public Use Determinations, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. R EV . 243, 267 (2012).
126. See generally David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI .
L. REV . 373 (2003) (analyzing contemporary elements of judicial review of
state legislation in an effort to clarify the modern understanding of the
infamous Lochner decision, which characterizes it as well outside the judicial
mainstream). See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
419–22, 424–25 (1934) (discussing the interplay of the police power doctrine
with the Contract Clause in consideration of the constitutionality of a
Minnesota mortgagee relief statute enacted during the Great Depression).
But see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause,
51 U. C HI. L. REV . 703, 735–40 (1984) (arguing that the police power doctrine
has come to eviscerate the importance and utility of the Contract Clause).
127. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488–
91 (1955) (explaining the contemporary “rational basis” test). See also
Epstein, supra note 126, at 735–40.
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construct a hypothetical where legislation would fall outside this
broad classification of state power. Courts have recognized even
“broad and generalized economic or social problems” as
permissible purposes for the execution of legislation under the
doctrine of police power.128 As such, this hurdle is especially easy
for a state to clear. It is necessary for the judiciary to fully grasp
the government’s intended public purpose to come to a proper
conclusion under Prong III.
Despite the historically low burden placed on states to justify
legislation in other constitutional contexts, the independent
importance of a legitimate public purpose in the context of a
Contract Clause challenge to a public contract remains somewhat
unclear. Chief Justice Burger argued for heavier judicial scrutiny
at this prong in his concurring opinion in United States Trust Co.
of New York.129 There, Burger stated that in order for the law in
question to avoid running afoul of the Contract Clause, “the state
must demonstrate that the impairment was essential to the
achievement of an important state purpose.”130 Justice Burger
continued that, in his opinion, “the State must show that it did not
know and could not have known the impact of the contract on that
state interest at the time that the contract was made.”131 This
specific deviation from general judicial deference to the police
power doctrine at Prong II has not been expressly followed by
courts, despite the impression that it logically comports with the
principal that stricter judicial scrutiny should apply to both Prong
II and III of the Contract Clause analysis.
C. Is the Modification of the Rights and Responsibilities of the
Parties to the Contract “Reasonable and Necessary” in Light of the
Public Purpose?
If the government can meet the historically low burden of
articulating a legitimate public purpose behind the impairment of
a public contract, the court must then evaluate if the impairment
of the contract is reasonable and necessary in light of the
articulated public purpose. It is important to note that the context
128.
129.
130.
131.

U.S. Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978).
431 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
Id.
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of the court’s determination of the reasonableness of a law’s means
is related to the extent of the contractual impairment determined
at Prong I of the analysis. 132 For contracts with the state, a more
demanding review is necessary at this level, because the state’s
self-interest in surviving the Contract Clause challenge might
cause its legislature to make legislative findings and judgments
which are not objective, but prejudiced in favor of the state.133
Thus, courts defer to the legislature to a lesser degree in order to
account for the likelihood of the state’s underlying self-interest.134
The federal District Courts of Washington have offered five
factors to contextualize the inquiry into the reasonableness of a
law’s means. Under their test, courts should consider:
(1) the emergency nature of the legislation; (2) whether
the state had previously regulated the subject activity; (3)
whether the impact is generalized or specifically directed
toward a narrow class; (4) whether the reliance on preexisting rights was both actual and reasonable; and (5)
whether the challenged law worked a severe, permanent,
and immediate change in those relationships reasonably
relied upon.135
A judicial determination of “reasonableness” traditionally
rests on the law itself.136 The reasonableness test, in the Contract
Clause context, was described by Justice Blackmun in United
States Trust Co. of New York as essentially “whether the reason
for the impairment was foreseeable in light of the surrounding
circumstances at the time the contract was made.”137 As noted
above, the review does not reach formal heightened standards of
review; the Supreme Court appears to have articulated a standard
of reasonableness that assesses more than whether the law is
132. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983).
133. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26; Md. State Teachers
Ass’n, Inc. v. Hughes, 594 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (D. Md. 1984).
134. See, e.g., RUI One Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 371 F.3d 1137, 1147 (9th
Cir. 2004).
135. Cycle Barn, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1203
(W.D. Wash. 2010) (citing Chico’s Pizza Franchises, Inc. v. Sisemore, 544 F.
Supp. 248, 249 (E.D. Wash. 1981)).
136. See, e.g., McGarth v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).
137. Clarke, supra note 85, at 197 (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S.
at 31–32).
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rational but does not require intermediate or strict scrutiny. The
analysis is instead, as Justice Blackmun notes, analogous to
questions raised by negligence law. The fundamental question to
be asked is whether the government’s chosen means, considering
the circumstances of the law and the substantial impairments it
places on contractual obligations, are ones that a reasonable
individual would foresee at the creation of the contract.
The question of whether the law is “necessary” in light of the
public purpose invites the court to consider the existence of any
less restrictive, viable alternatives that exist for the state. 138 A
state cannot not pass legislation substantially impairing its own
contractual obligation without first pursuing other alternatives
which might achieve a similar public purpose. 139 Additionally, the
court should look to severity of impairment and consider if a more
moderate course of action might serve the purported public
purposes equally well.140 The necessity element is a separate and
independent analysis to the reasonableness inquiry. A law cannot
be either reasonable or necessary to survive challenge; the law’s
means must be both reasonable and necessary.
III. RIRSA AND THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

This Section applies the substance and effect of RIRSA,
discussed above in Section I, to the general legal framework of a
publically impaired Contract Clause challenge, discussed in
Section II. This Section addresses each element of a Contract
Clause analysis in order to fully explore the issues likely to arise.
138. See id. (citing U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 29–30) (establishing
that an impairment is “necessary” if the legislature’s purpose cannot be
accomplished by impairment in a less drastic fashion and alternative means
of achieving the legislature’s purpose without impairment are not available).
See also, e.g., Univ. of Hawaii Prof’l Assemb. v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096,
1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing that a contractual impairment may not be
considered necessary, for Contract Clause purposes, if there is an alternative
that would also serve the defendants’ purpose, especially since the Contract
Clause limits the state in curtailing its obligations unnecessarily); Balt.
Teachers Union v. City Council of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1020 (4th Cir. 1993)
(stating that a court must consider whether a state is acting in self-interest
in abridging contract obligations, and also whether more reasonable means
exist, in order to decide whether the contract impairment violates the
Contract Clause).
139. See, e.g., Cayetano, 183 F. 3d at 1107.
140. See, e.g., Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1020.
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As of this writing, the current RIRSA litigation pending in the
Rhode Island Superior Court is awaiting a final settlement
order.141 Notwithstanding any forthcoming resolution of that
particular dispute, the underlying issues with RIRSA’s
constitutionality remain salient. This Comment explores the legal
theory underpinning a challenge to RIRSA under the Contract
Clause of the Rhode Island Constitution. A proper application of
the Contract Clause to RIRSA will result in the law’s invalidation.
RIRSA substantially impairs a public contract by means that are
not reasonable and appropriate to secure the interests it asserts.
Although the law serves a legitimate governmental interest in
balancing the state’s budgetary liabilities, that financial burden
alone is insufficient for the law to survive a Contract Clause
challenge. Each element is addressed in turn below.
A. Is There A Substantial Impairment of a Public Contract?
The first element of a Contract Clause challenge is assessing
whether there is a substantial impairment of a contract by the
legislation in question. This involves answering a necessary
predicate question: is there, in fact, a contract between the parties
(here, the state and its public-sector employees)? Once this
threshold question has been answered, the inquiry turns to
addressing whether the contract is substantially impaired. This
question has been litigated by the parties; however, this Comment
argues that, independent of the reasoning of the superior court,
RIRSA substantially impairs a contract between the State of
Rhode Island and its workforce.
i. Whether There is, in fact, a Contractual Relationship Between
Rhode Island and Members of the Public Pension Systems
As discussed in Section II.A.i above, the initial hurdle for
plaintiffs bringing a Contract Clause challenge is significantly
higher in cases where the alleged contract at issue is with the
state.142 To clear this hurdle, the plaintiffs must first establish
that a contract exists between themselves and the State of Rhode
Island. While only a preliminary step in the greater scheme of
141. See Gregg, supra note 76.
142. See discussion supra Part II.A. See also Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I.
Emps. Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 60 (1st Cir. 1999).
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clearing Prong I of a Contract Clause challenge for plaintiffs, it is
nevertheless a step of dire importance and difficulty. 143
The existence of a contractual relationship was the only issue
addressed by the Rhode Island Superior Court in its constitutional
evaluation of RIRSA. 144 Thus, this subsection will focus primarily
on the plaintiffs’ and government’s arguments articulated at this
stage. After a summary of the arguments and the opinion of the
court, the remainder of the analysis will depart from describing
the specific facts of the ongoing challenge to RIRSA and will apply
the test of the Contract Clause to RIRSA directly.
A sub-class of plaintiffs145 with more than ten years of service
under their proverbial belt received an encouraging sign in April
of 2014 when the Associate Justice of the Rhode Island Superior
Court presiding over the case, Judge Sarah Taft-Carter, rejected a
motion to dismiss brought by the State. 146 Judge Taft-Carter
recognized a unilateral, implied-in-fact contract between the
employees with ten or more years of service and the State of
Rhode Island.147
In its consolidated motion to dismiss, the State leaned heavily
on the unmistakability doctrine to support the claim that there
was no statutory language to support the plaintiffs’ initial burden
of establishing a contract with the state. 148 Judge Taft-Carter
recognized that, although Rhode Island has yet to expressly adopt
the unmistakability doctrine, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
adopted its foundational reasoning in Brennan v. Kirby.149 While
143. See, e.g., Justus v. State, 336 P.3d 202, 208–09 (Colo. 2014).
144. See Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014
WL 1743142, at * 15 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014).
145. See id. at *1 n.1; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-1 (2011); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 16-16-22 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-21-41 (2009).
146. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *2.
147. Id. at *14. Judge Taft-Carter went on to clarify that this was only a
preliminary step in finding merit in the plaintiffs ’ constitutional claims
against the government and elaborated that the court had not made a final
ruling with respect to the State’s ability to unilaterally alter the pension
statute with respect to the sub-set of plaintiff-employees who have not yet
fully retired. Id.
148. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 7–9, R.I. Pub.
Emps.’ Ret. Coal., v. Chafee, No. PC123166, 2014 WL 1577496 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Apr. 16, 2014), 2012 WL 5520089.
149. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *6–7 (“[O]ur
Supreme Court stated that, absent a clear indication by the Legislature that
it intended to bind itself contractually by passing an enactment, the
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she acknowledged that Rhode Island does not expressly state that
pension benefits are contractual in nature, she also brought
attention to Rhode Island General Laws section 36-10-7, entitled
“Guaranty by state—Annual appropriations.”150 Section 36-10-7
provides, inter alia, that “it is the intention of the state to make
payment of the annuities, benefits, and retirement allowances
provided for under the provisions of this chapter.”151 Further, the
court stated that “the language [of § 36-10-7] provides some
evidence that the State promised to provide some pension benefits,
§ 36-10-7 does not promise any particular amount of pension
benefits, nor does it indicate that the benefit levels may not be
changed or altered.”152 In her analysis of the language of section
36-10-7, Judge Taft-Carter relied heavily upon the First Circuit’s
reasoning in National Education Ass’n-R.I. ex rel. Scigulinsky v.
Retirement Board of Rhode Island Employees’ Retirement
System.153 There, the court concluded that the language of section
36-10-7 “falls at least a step short of clearly expressing a
contractual commitment not to change benefit levels or other plan
variables by legislation” and, therefore, fails to meet the clear and
unequivocal standard of the federal unmistakability doctrine. 154
Thus, Judge Taft-Carter ultimately concluded that the isolated
text of section 36-10-7 is ambiguous for the purposes of finding
that the legislature intended to be bound contractually to the
presumption pervades that [the] law is not intended to create private
contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursed until
the legislature shall ordain otherwise.” (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d
633, 638 (R.I. 1887)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150. Id. at *7; R.I GEN. LAWS § 36-10-7 (2011) (providing language that
arguably evinces the Rhode Island legislatures intent to be contractual ly
bound to the full payment of pension benefits to members of the public
retirement benefit system). Compare M ASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 32, § 25(5) (2009),
with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-1 (2011) (contrasting the express statutory
language of a Massachusetts statute establishing contractual pension
benefits with the absence of such language in Rhode Island laws defining the
public pension system).
151. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-7.
152. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *8.
153. Id. (citing Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I.
Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1999)).
154. Scigulinsky, 172 F.3d at 28; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465–66 (1985)
(articulating the need for the language of legislation to clearly and
unequivocally indicate legislative intent to be bound by contract for the
purposes of the unmistakability doctrine).
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payment of public pension benefits. 155
Finding ambiguity in the contractual nature of the pure
language of section 36-10-7, Judge Taft-Carter went on to clarify
that the statute may be interpreted as a contract in cases where
the legislative intent to be bound is established and supported by
language of the statute and the surrounding circumstances.156
Accordingly, she turned to a brief analysis of the legislative
history of section 36-10-7.157 She acknowledged that the General
Assembly expressly reversed the right to amend, alter, or repeal
provisions of the Municipal Employment Retirement System
(“MERS”).158 Thus, it appears that the General Assembly had an
opportunity to implement a similar provision for the ERSRI but
did not elect to do so.159 However, Judge Taft-Carter declined to
“construe the absence of such a provision as evidence of an
unmistakable intent to be contractually bound” and concluded
that “[§ 36-10-7] remains ambiguous as to the existence of a
contractual relationship between Plaintiffs and the State.”160
Failing to find any conclusive evidence of legislative
contractual intent from the legislative history, Judge Taft-Carter
ultimately turned to foundational principles of contract law—
namely offer and acceptance—in reaching her conclusion. 161 In so
doing, she was careful to distinguish the State as an employer
contracting with employees as opposed to a sovereign dealing with
private citizens.162 Thus, the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between the state and its employees weighs in favor
of finding an implied contract. 163 She found that the government
had made an offer by inducing the employees to enter into a
155. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *8.
156. Id. at *9; see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17
n.14 (1977); Retired Adjunct Professors of R.I. v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1242,
1346 (R.I. 1997).
157. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *7.
158. Id. at *2; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-21-47 (2009).
159. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *8.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *12.
162. Id. at *11.
163. Id. at *16–17; see also Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex rel. Scigulinsky v.
Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1999). See also
McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[A] pension plan
represents an implied-in-fact unilateral contract [in the context of both] state
and municipal pension plans.”).
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bargain by dangling the incentive of a pension payment. 164 The
State offered these pension benefits in exchange for “continued
and faithful service” to the State and pension system. 165 She
concluded that “[w]ith respect to unilateral contracts, an offeree
may accept an offer by beginning to perform.”166 Therefore, the
plaintiffs accepted the State’s offer by beginning their
employment, contributing to the mandatory pension system, and,
for the purposes of this sub-class of plaintiffs, continued their
service for the required time (ten years) in order for the pension
benefits to become vested as prescribed by the governing pension
statute.167
Judge Taft-Carter’s holding, while favorable for challengers to
RIRSA, must be taken with a procedural grain of salt. This
decision was in response to a pre-trial motion to dismiss filed by
the State and, thus, is to be viewed through the prism of Rhode
Island’s liberal pleading standards. Accordingly, the court “[did]
not deal with the likelihood of success [of the plaintiffs Contract
Clause challenge] on the merits, but rather with the viability of
[the] plaintiff’s bare-bones allegations and claims as they are set
forth in the complaint.”168 Therefore, in finding a unilateral,
implied-in-fact contract between the State and the plaintiffs,
Judge Taft-Carter must have “assume[d] that the allegations
contained in the complaint [were] true, and examine[d] the facts
in light most favorable to the nonmoving party”—in this case, the
challengers to the legislation. 169
This decision establishes the importance of “vesting” in the
impending analysis. Judge Taft-Carter recognized that there is
164. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *11–12.
165. Id. at *12; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10.1-1 (2011) (“Rhode Island
Public Employee Pension Revocation and Reduction Act”).
166. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *12 (citing
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:26 (4th ed. 2010)).
167. See id. See also “Vested” in Glossary of Terms, EMPS .’ R ET. S YS. OF
R.I., http://content.ersri.org/glossary-of-terms/#gsc.tab=0 (last visited Mar.
22, 2015) (“You must have 10 years of contributing service credit to be vested
in ERSRI. Once you are vested, you are eligible to collect a retirement
benefit when you reach retirement age.”).
168. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps., 2014 WL 1743142, at *4 (quoting
Hyatt v. V ill. House Convalescent Home, Inc., 880 A.2d 821, 823 (R.I. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id. (quoting Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259, 270 (R.I. 2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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significant disagreement in Rhode Island case law over exactly
when pension benefits vest for the purposes of establishing a
legally cogent contract. 170
The initial determination of the
existence of a contractual relationship becomes somewhat
convoluted in cases of public pension reform because of
inconsistent interpretation of vested pension benefits throughout
the states. The question of when exactly a contractual provision
vests in an employee is a highly complex issue that can frustrate
an entire Contract Clause analysis. For example, if a court
concludes that the benefit has not yet vested in the employee, then
there is, of course, no contractual relationship to impede through
legislation. Some states have taken a very liberal approach to this
issue and have concluded that a public employee’s benefits vest at
the beginning of their employment. 171 Thus, if a state legislature
substantially changes a retirement benefit system on a public
employee’s first day on the job, she presumably has a contractual
right to that benefit for the purposes of a Contract Clause
analysis.172 On the other end of the spectrum, some states have
held that pension rights only become contractually vested at the
time of retirement or eligibility for retirement.173 Some states
170. Id. at *10. Cf. Buck, supra note 6, at 20 (describing vested rights
interchangeably with contractual rights). But see Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-R.I. ex
rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 172 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.
1999) (“‘V esting’ and ‘contractual’ are not synonymous.”).
171. See Buck, supra note 6, at 54. The California Supreme Court has
held that “[a] public employee’s pension constitutes an element of
compensation, and a vested contractual right to pension benefits accrues
upon acceptance of employment. Such a pension right may not be destroyed,
once vested, without impairing a contractual obligation of the employing
public entity.” Betts v. Bd. of Admin. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 582 P.2d 614,
617 (Cal. 1978).
172. See Buck, supra note 6, at 54. Although whether this contract is
substantially impaired is apparently a different question entirely. The
Oregon Supreme Court held that “[a]n employee’s contract right to pension
benefits becomes vested at the time of his or her acceptance of employment.
On vesting, an employee’s contractual interest in a pension plan may not be
substantially impaired by subsequent legislation.” Hughes v. Oregon, 838
P.2d 1018, 1029 (Ore. 1992) (citations omitted).
173. See Buck, supra note 6, at 55. The Nevada Supreme Court held:
Until an employee has earned his retirement pay, or until the time
arrives when he may retire, his retirement pay is but an inchoate
right; but when the conditions are satisfied, at that time retirement
pay becomes a vested right of which the person entitled thereto
cannot be deprived; it has ripened into a full contractual obligation.
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have taken a more dynamic approach to this question and have
concluded that pension rights become contractual at some point
later than the beginning of employment, although the exact period
is usually undefined.174
Rhode Island public pension benefits appear to vest in
employees who have contributed at least ten years of faithful and
honorable service.175
Thus, any public employee who has
“contributed money [to the Public Employment systems] that, in
addition to their continued service, was given in exchange for the
State’s promise to provide pension benefits” has established an
implied-in-fact contract with the State of Rhode Island. 176 This
conclusion, of course, does little for any employee who has not met
the ten-year threshold. However, “[the Rhode Island] Supreme
Court appears to have accepted that pension rights become
enforceable as contracts once an employee has fulfilled the
statutory requirements, if not before.”177 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court has “specifically acknowledged that ‘[c]ontract
rights may attach upon entering public employment and
service.’”178
In sum, it seems clear that retired employees, as well as
employees with at least ten years of honorable service and
Nicholas v. Nevada, 992 P.2d 262, 264 (Nev. 2000) (quoting Police Pension &
Relief Bd. of Denver v. McPhail, 338 P.2d 694, 700 (Colo. 1959)).
174. Buck, supra note 6, at 54–55. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated
that “we are not convinced that a [pension] plan is ‘frozen’ against
detrimental changes or modifications the moment an employee begins to
participate in it, where such changes are necessary to preserve the fiscal and
actuarial integrity of the plan as a whole.” Blackwell v. Quarterly Cnty. Ct.
of Shelby Cnty., 622 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tenn. 1981). However, the Kansas
Supreme Court stated that public employees have a contractual right in the
state pension system after “[c]ontinued employment over a reasonable period
of time during which substantial services are furnished to the employer, plan
membership is maintained, and regular contributions to the fund are made.”
Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467, 474 (Kan. 1980).
175. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-9 (2011) (providing that, inter alia, the
statutory requirement for state employees is ten years of contributory
service); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-16-12 (providing that, inter alia, the statutory
requirement for teachers is ten years of contributory service).
176. Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014 WL
1743142, at *13–14 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014).
177. Id. at *13 (emphasis added) (citing In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375,
1385–86 (R.I. 1992)).
178. Id. at *19 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Almedia, 611 A.2d at
1385).

BURNHAMFINAL EDITW OR D. DOC X (D O N OT D ELETE)

5/19/2015 1:19 PM

2015]RHODE ISLAND’S SACRIFICIAL ECONOMIC LAMB 555
contribution to ERISA, have a contractual relationship with the
State of Rhode Island. Although apparently not at issue in the
RIRSA litigation,179 the Rhode Island Supreme Court has left
open the possible existence of a contractual relationship between
non-vested, public employees and the State of Rhode Island.180
The scope of these relationships is variable depending on the
employment status of the plaintiff, but, for the purposes of a
Contract Clause challenge, it appears that most, if not all, state
employees have a contractual relationship with the State of Rhode
Island.
At the very least, RIRSA impairs contractual
relationships that have already been created, and it was designed
to do precisely that. Because the fundamental purpose of RIRSA
is to redefine preexisting contractual relationships with employees
whose pension plans have already vested, at least some plaintiffs
can challenge the law.
ii. Does RIRSA Impair the Contractual Relationship Between the
Public Employees and the State of Rhode Island?
Recall that, for the purposes of a Contract Clause challenge,
courts have considered an “impairment” to be a mere alteration to
the contractual relationship. 181 According to noted public pension
reform commentator Amy B. Monahan, case law indicates that it
is relatively easy for a challenger to establish a contractual
179. Id. at *19 (“Because the instant case involves Plaintiffs who have
already vested, it is not necessary for the Court to decide what, if any,
contractual rights may attach before vesting. For the purposes of this case,
Plaintiffs are all vested employees who have fulfilled the statutory
requirements.”).
180. See In re Almedia, 611 A.2d at 1385, 1386. But see Retired Adjunct
Professors of R.I. v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342, 1345, 1346 (R.I. 1997). In
Almond, the Rhode Island Supreme Court explored the notion that reliance
interest alone should not determine the contractual nature of a legislative
enactment as it would greatly limit the amount of permissible statutory
changes to pension-benefit schemes. Id. However, commentators have
dissented on the judiciary’s ubiquitous majoritarian policy concern for the
possibility of state legislatures being tethered to past “contracts,” thus
rendering them politically inflexible with their sovereign powers in the
future. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 126, at 709, 717, 718, 719, 732, 735, 738.
181. See, e.g., McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., By and Through Mayer, 906 F.
Supp. 749, 764 (D.R.I. 1995) (“The question of whether the contract was
impaired has already been answered in the affirmative . . . The more
nettlesome question is whether that deprivation amounted to a substantial
impairment.”). See also discussion supra Part II.A.ii.
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impairment in the realm of public pension law. 182 “[M]any
legislative changes to public pension plans are found to be
impairments [including] benefit formula changes, . . . changes in
funding sources or methodology[,] state action eliminating [COLA]
supplemental payments[, and] offsetting pension benefits by the
amount of workers’ compensation benefits received.”183
As noted above, RIRSA imposes three major substantive
changes to the public pension benefit system: (i) changing the
retirement benefit system from a pure defined contribution system
to a “hybrid” system, (ii) the suspension and permanent reduction
of COLAs, and (iii) the increased retirement age. Taking into
account Monahan’s framework, it is clear that all three of these
legislative changes constitute an “impairment” for the purposes of
this analysis.184 However, a mere impairment of a contractual
relationship or obligation is not enough to satisfy Prong I of the
Contract Clause analysis. The challenger must further establish
that this impairment is of requisite substantiality to justify
further judicial review of state legislative interference with a
public contract.
iii. Is the Contractual Impairment Imposed by RIRSA of Requisite
Substantiality to Justify Further Analysis?
The contractual rights and relationships established between
the State of Rhode Island and the members of the public
retirement system have been substantially impaired by the
alterations of RIRSA.
Recall that many Contract Clause
challenges to alleged impairments of public contracts falter at this
stage; however, none of the legislation previously evaluated
contains the degree of sweeping and severe legislative alteration
as does RIRSA.
No state employee could have reasonably
expected that the State would attempt to warp the public
employment benefit system in such a drastic way. RIRSA is more
than mere commonplace regulation of a pension system; it is an
unprecedented and drastic economic measure taken with the
expressly stated purpose of avoiding state financial insolvency.
However, at this stage of the Contract Clause analysis, the
182.
183.
184.

M ONAHAN, supra note 17, at 15.
Id.
See id.
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purpose and potential justification for the impairment is
immaterial. It is sufficient at this stage to accept that the
impairment of the contractual relationship and rights flowing
from that relationship between state employees and the Rhode
Island government are surely substantial enough to reach further
inquiry.
The first two elements of RIRSA’s pension-reform framework,
the benefit reduction and change to a defined contribution plan
and the COLA reductions—by themselves—substantially impair
the contractual relationship between the State and its employees.
The shift from a pure defined benefit retirement system to a
hybrid system is the most drastic measure. 185 This element of
RIRSA dramatically warped the very structure of the public
employee benefit system such that it is almost beyond recognition.
While Rhode Island’s old retirement system was not especially
generous to retirees, the new system imposed by RIRSA
represents not just a reasonably expected erosion of those benefits,
but a palpable corruption of the expectation interests and
idiosyncratic retirement plans of contributing public employees. 186
RIRSA changes the accrual rate under the residual defined
benefit plan from a guaranteed benefit based on calculable factors,
to one percent of the final average salary per year of service. 187
Additionally, under RIRSA, five percent of the employee’s salary—
more than half of their total contribution—is automatically
deposited into a mandatory defined contribution account. 188 The
formulaic changes from a defined contribution plan to a hybrid
plan, articulated in Section 7 of RIRSA, impose on the average
thirty-year worker “an average benefits cut of 14 percent.”189
While this number is a significant decrease of guaranteed benefits
in and of itself, it has the potential to become even more
substantial after one considers the market risks to which the
employee is exposed to as a result of RIRSA’s defined contribution

185. See discussion supra Part I.A. See also 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 7.
186. See discussion supra Part I.A. See also 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 7.
See also HILTONSMITH, supra, note 21, at 2; M ORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 4.
187. See discussion supra Part I.A.; 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 7. See also
HILTONSMITH, supra, note 21, at 3.
188. HILTONSMITH, supra, note 21, at 3.
189. Id. at 2.
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system.190
Beyond the raw mathematical impairment imposed by
RIRSA, the shift from a defined benefit plan to a hybrid plan is
such a unique disruption of the status quo that it ultimately must
impact the employee’s expectations. A fundamental purpose of
the public pension system is to induce skilled workers away from
the private-sector with the promise of a lucrative pension. 191 In
Rhode Island, this pension was always structured, until RIRSA, as
a traditional defined benefit system. 192 As discussed above in
Section I.A, defined benefit plans are desirable to employees
because they are relatively calculable based on a variety of factors
that are largely in control of the employee herself. 193 Surely, a
number of public employees had at least partially planned for
their financial future around the concrete and comparatively
predictable benefit estimates under a defined benefit plan. By
dismantling the existing defined benefit system and sewing a
debased version of it back together with variable accrual formulas
and the unpredictable presence of market risk inherent in defined
contribution systems, RIRSA frustrates the public employees’
expected benefit of the bargain, not merely by reducing the actual
benefits, but by eviscerating future financial plans formulated in
reliance on the old pension system.
RIRSA’s manipulation of COLA benefits is also an
independent ground for finding a substantial impairment of the
contractual relationship between the government and the state
employees. The COLA reform element of RIRSA suspends COLA
benefits until the pension system is eighty percent funded and
permanently reduces the COLA formula once that threshold is
eventually reached.194 This applies to not only future and current

190. See id. (forecasting “[f]or the quarter of future employees who are in
the lowest quartile of investment returns on their [defined contribution] plan”
an average cut of “22 percent or higher”); M ORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 3.
191. See, e.g., Kern v. Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947); Cloutier
v. State, 42 A.3d 816, 823 (N.H. 2012); James B. Jacobs et al., Pension
Forfeiture: A Problematic Sanction for Public Corruption, 35 AM . CRIM . L.
REV . 57, 81 (1997).
192. See HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 2; M ORRISSEY, supra note 22, at
1.
193. See HILTONSMITH, supra note 21, at 2; RANDAZZO, supra note 13, at
18–19.
194. See discussion supra Part I.B (discussing COLA reform).
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state employees, but also impairs the benefits of retirees as well.
Retirees do not just have vested contractual rights in their
retirement benefits, but have fully completed their end of the
contractual relationship. Because retirees will presumably regain
their reduced COLA benefits once the pension system is eighty
percent funded, RIRSA appears to stop short of permanently
revoking COLA benefits for retirees. Given the expectation that it
will take approximately sixteen years to reach the eighty percent
threshold, this minimal concession for retirees is largely
illusory.195 If these estimations are correct, retirees will have
much less time to enjoy the benefit of COLA payments, as this
annuity traditionally extinguishes at the death of the retiree and
surviving spouse.196 Thus, the government appears to be running
out the proverbial clock on their obligations by suspending these
benefits until such a lofty goal of financial stability is achieved.
This is not just a delay in the provision of benefits. The stakes are
quite clear: either the retirees will have COLAs in the relatively
limited period before their deaths, or they will not. RIRSA stands
for the latter position.
Moreover, a fully vested retiree who has contributed a full
career’s worth of honorable service could, and should, not expect to
have their financial stability completely altered in retirement.
While some other options exist for retirees to maintain financial
stability in their post-work life, such as Individual Retirement
Accounts (“IRAs”), the retirees affected by RIRSA have not had
the benefit of foresight to plan for such an unprecedented
suspension of benefit. Retirees are generally too old to reenter the
workplace and supplant their benefits with additional income.
Therefore, unless the retiree has exhibited a paranoid level of
economic prudence, taking into account the possibility of a portion
of her retirement benefit completely drying up for an
indeterminate period of time, it is obvious that the retiree has had
195. See Bristol/Warren Reg’l Sch. Emps. v. Chafee, No. PC 12-3168, 2014
WL 1743142, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014).
196. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-30-17 (Supp. 2014) (“[A judge’s] surviving spouse
shall receive annually thereafter during his or her lifetime and so long as he
or she remains unmarried, an amount equal to one-half (1/2) of the annual
payment that the judge was receiving by way of salary or retirement pay at
the time of his or her death.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-30-18, 36-10-18 to -19.1
(Supp. 2014). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-10-35 (Supp. 2014) (providing the
statutory structure of COLA benefits before RIRSA).
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her contractual right substantially impaired. The mere possibility
that one retiree had her financial security and stability shaken by
the COLA suspension is sufficient to render RIRSA a substantial
impairment of the contractual relationship between the State and
the state employees.
Additionally, current vested employees likewise have an
argument that the COLA suspension and permanent reduction,
taken in isolation, are sufficient to constitute a substantial
impairment for the purposes of a Contract Clause challenge. As
already noted above, a principal purpose of a public pension
system is to lure skilled employees away from the private sector
by using a lucrative public pension as inducement. 197 A key
element of the public pension benefit system is COLAs. As
discussed above in Section I.B, COLAs operate as a supplemental
source of income for retirees to help cope with the costs of living
following retirement. A permanent reduction of these benefits
represents a substantial step backward from the premise that
COLAs are intended to operate in step with increasing inflation
costs, thus rendering the COLA, and the public pension benefit
system by proxy, substantially less lucrative than when the public
employee originally joined the workforce.
The increase in retirement age, standing alone, does not have
as substantial of an effect as the shift to a hybrid plan and the
COLA reductions. It does, when taken in context with the other
two changes, however, work to substantially impair a state
employee’s contractual relationship with the State. Depending on
the age of the employee, an increased retirement age can have a
significant impact on the future retirement expectations of the
employee. This requires the employee to contribute additional
years to the pension system—while also being that much older,
and thus closer to extinguishment of pension payouts from the
State. Additionally, this impacts the expectations and future plans
of the employee, especially if the employee in question is older and
closer to retirement.198 Although this is certainly an impairment
of a contractual relationship, it does not appear to be of the
requisite substantiality to invoke the heightened judicial review of
197. See, e.g., Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947);
Cloutier v. State, 42 A.3d 816, 823 (N.H. 2011); Jacobs et al., supra note 191,
at 81.
198. See Buck, supra note 6, at 77.
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a public contract for the purposes of a Contract Clause analysis. 199
However, when taken in conjunction with the aggregate effect of
the other two independently substantial impairments imposed by
RIRSA, it is clear that the overall effect of RIRSA substantially
impairs the pension contracts between public employees and the
State.
One independent substantial impairment would be
sufficient, but RIRSA imposes two and adds a third significant
factor that exacerbates the harms caused by the other two.
While it is apparent that the government is permitted to
make reasonable and insubstantial modifications to contractual
relationships, RIRSA and the various contractual impairments
that flow from it greatly exceed the level of traditional and
reasonable modification. 200 For example, in Retired Adjunct
Professors of the State of Rhode Island v. Almond, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island initially failed to find a contractual
relationship between the parties, but it went on to note that, even
if there was a contractual relationship, it was not substantial
enough to warrant further review under the Contract Clause. 201
There, the plaintiffs challenged a state statute under the Contract
Clause that, in effect, imposed a $10,000 cap on the annual
earnings of retired public employees that reentered the workplace
after retirement.202 On the substantiality element, the court
reasoned that “it is not even clear as a factual matter that the new
$10,000 cap on reemployment earnings will actually have an
adverse (let alone substantially adverse) impact on all of these
plaintiffs’ previous earnings under the [previous reemployment
scheme].”203 Here, the aggregate effect of increased investment
risk in a compulsory hybrid system, the suspension of benefits for
an indeterminate amount of time, the permanent reduction of
some benefits, and an increased retirement age clearly leaves
little doubt as to whether RIRSA will have an adverse impact on
public employees.
The court in Retired Adjunct Professors also reasoned that the
199. See, e.g., Pineman v. Oechslin, 637 F.2d 601, 603 (2d Cir. 1981)
(ultimately not addressing the issue on abstention grounds).
200. See, e.g., McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., By and Through Mayer, 906 F.
Supp. 749, 764 (D.R.I. 1995).
201. 690 A.2d 1342, 1345–48 (R.I. 1997).
202. Id. at 1344, 1347.
203. Id. at 1347.

BURNHAMFINAL EDITW OR D. DOC X (D O N OT D ELETE)

5/19/2015 1:19 PM

562 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:523
alleged impairment was not substantial because “[p]ublic pensions
have always been a heavily regulated legal arena. Therefore,
individual expectations of immunity from future statutory change
would have been unwarranted.”204 Unlike the plaintiffs in Retired
Adjunct Professors, the challengers to RIRSA encompass a diverse
breadth of state employees. Therefore, this is not a case of
individual expectations of immunity among sub-classifications of
employees, but rather, this is a collective challenge to burdensome
elements of RIRSA that echo through multiple chapters of Rhode
Island civil law.
Although courts, including the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in Retired Adjunct Professors,205 have considered previous
government regulation of the industry as indicia that evinces a
lack of “substantial” impairment in Contract Clause challenges,
this is by no means a determinative finding. In Retired Adjunct
Professors, the court addressed the regulation of reemployment
benefits that, while facially similar to retirement benefits and
COLAs, are more similar to health benefits. 206 Unlike health
benefits and reemployment benefits, which are subject to the
“vagaries of labor negotiations,”207 Rhode Island General Laws
section 36-11-12 provides that “[a]ny and all matters relating to
the employees’ retirement system of the state of Rhode Island are
excluded as negotiable items in the collective bargaining
process.”208 Therefore, it would be misguided to attach strong
persuasive weight to the “substantial impairment” element of the
Retired Adjunct Professors analysis because that court confronted
a very distinguishable aspect of related facts. 209
However, even if one is to accept the general premise that
204. Id. at 1347; accord McGrath, 906 F. Supp. at 764.
205. See, e.g., Retired Adjunct Professors, 690 A.2d at 1347; Nat’l Educ.
Ass’n-Rhode Island v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 890 F. Supp. 1143,
1163–64 (D.R.I. 1997) (opining that the challenged statute substantially
impaired a contractual relationship despite the fact that the contractual
relationship involved the highly regulated industry of public pensions).
206. Retired Adjunct Professors, 690 A.2d at 1343.
207. R.I. Council 94 v. Carcieri, No. PC 10-2859, 2011 WL 4198506, at *30
(R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011) (quoting Uricoli v. Bd. of Trs., Police &
Firemen’s Ret. Sys., 449 A.2d 1267, 1273 (N.J. 1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (adopting a portion of the analysis implemented in Uricoli).
208. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-11-12 (2011). See also Carcieri, 2011 WL
4198506, at *30.
209. See 690 A.2d at 1347.
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public pensions are subject to substantial statutory modification
and therefore more difficult for challengers to establish a
substantial impairment,210 the massive and unendurable burden
imposed by RIRSA upon such an widespread group of current and
retired public-sector employees in Rhode Island is nonetheless
sufficiently unreasonable to establish a substantial impairment
and, at a minimum, justify further review. 211 The bottom line is
that RIRSA represents a remarkably broad and unprecedented
attempt at public pension reform with alarmingly ambitious goals
and very real hardships for members of the public employment
system as a result. Commentators are generally compelled to
remark on the radical nature and broad reformatory stroke of
RIRSA regardless of whether they are criticizing or applauding
the legislation.212 Because of the expansive nature of RIRSA, any
argument flowing from the premise that public pension systems
are traditionally regulated and, therefore, impairments are not
requisitely substantial, must fail. No public employee could
reasonably be assumed to have considered the risk of a wholesale
government rebuild of the public pension system that
substantially reduces contractual rights at multiple junctures.
The presumed underpinning of this premise is that public
employees should expect some reasonable modification in their
field; however, RIRSA is far from reasonable. Even if one
disagrees with the notion that RIRSA is patently unreasonable,
further evaluation at Prongs II and III of the Contract Clause test
are then at least necessary.
In sum, individual elements of RIRSA standing alone severely
impact the contractual rights established between the government
and vested state employees, including retirees. 213 RIRSA does not
210. See id.
211. See M ORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 7–8.
212. Compare V on Drehle, supra note 10, at 32, 36 (commenting on the
ambitiousness of the reform while also applauding the reformatory effort),
with Walsh, supra note 13, at 4 (commenting on the breadth of the reform
effort while highlighting concern of public employees in 2011). See also
M ORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 1.
213. Note that a public employee with less than ten years of service is not
completely ruled out at this stage. If she succeeds in establishing a
contractual relationship with the State, she too can presumably establish a
substantial impairment of that relationship. See discussion supra Part
III.A.i.
Modifications to pension systems that frustrate merely the
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just impose one or two of the elements discussed, rather it imposes
all three, plus a variety of additional modifications to the public
retirement system that, for the sake of brevity, will not be
discussed in this Comment. While Rhode Island’s public pension
system may have suffered through “a death by a thousand cuts,”
the deepest and most significant of the cuts are a direct result of
RIRSA.214 RIRSA is not a traditional legislative modification of a
public pension system; it is a remarkably broad act that imposes a
diverse array of burdens on public employees across the entire
public-sector. The aggregate burdens and impairments of RIRSA
rise to the level of substantiality necessary for challengers to clear
the heightened first prong of the Contract Clause analysis.
B. Can Rhode Island Show a Legitimate Public Purpose Behind
RIRSA?
Having addressed the predicate issue of whether RIRSA
substantially impairs a public contract, the analysis turns to
whether the government can articulate a legitimate purpose
behind the legislation. A state may impair a contract where it
serves a legitimate governmental interest through necessary and
appropriate means.215 It is important to note again that while
this language mirrors in many respects the rational basis test
employed by courts, it is clearly not the rational basis test.
Neither, however, is it intermediate or strict scrutiny. The
appropriate test for a Contract Clause challenge involving a public
contract employs a more searching inquiry than the deferential
rational basis test, but does not reach the exacting inquiry of more
expectation interest in non-vested benefits are generally insufficient for the
purposes of establishing requisite substantiality of impairment for the
purposes of the Contract Clause.
See, e.g., Nonnenmacher v. City of
Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 1999). However, some courts have found
that non-vested employees have contractual rights in pension plans, with
those rights being subject to reasonable modification by the legislature. See,
e.g., Nev. Emps. Ass’n, Inc. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1990).
The question of RIRSA’s reasonableness is certainly in question and is better
suited at Prongs II and III of the Contract Clause analysis; thus, non-vested
employees should be afforded the benefit of further judicial review.
214. M ORRISSEY, supra note 22, at 7.
215. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977);
Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 59 (1st Cir. 1999);
R.I. Hospitality Ass’n v. City of Providence, 775 F. Supp. 2d 416, 434 (D.R.I.
2011); Nonnenmacher, 722 A.2d at 1202.
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formal heightened scrutiny. It appears that this is the case
because Contract Clause jurisprudence, both in Rhode Island and
nationally, is unfortunately far less developed than other areas of
law dealing with heightened scrutiny. To exceed rational basis
while not reaching heightened scrutiny invites a simple solution:
the judiciary should make an independent assessment of the
reasonableness of the law. This does not invoke the mere
rationality of the law, but the reasonableness of its application to
circumstances. The purpose of this step of the Contract Clause
evaluation is to establish the legitimate public purpose behind the
legislation that will be evaluated with extra vigilance at Prong III
of the analysis.216 As a normative matter, the government
generally has no issue with establishing a legitimate public
purpose. As such, this Section will introduce some of the potential
legislative purposes behind RIRSA identified in the “Legislative
intent and findings” section of the law itself, but will operate
under a presumption of legitimacy consistent with general,
analytic themes in constitutional jurisprudence. 217
At the outset of RIRSA, the General Assembly expressed its
primary intention “to ensure the sustainability of the state’s
public retirement systems.”218 In support of this intent, the
legislature reiterated the vulnerabilities of Rhode Island’s public
pension system and the general economic hardships that the State
faced at the time of the legislation.219
Additionally, they
identified “Rhode Island’s critically underfunded pension system”
as a factor that, when combined with the State’s general economic
woes and preexisting tax burden to citizens, “threatens the base
pensions of current and future public workers, hampers the ability
of the state to provide its citizens with vital services necessary for
the public’s health, safety and welfare, and places an
unsustainable financial burden on all Rhode Island citizens and
taxpayers.”220 In a similar vein, the legislature expressed concern
that Rhode Island’s current pension system, if left as is, “will
substantially increase Rhode Island’s capital cost structure and
adversely affect and greatly diminish the state’s ability to address
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See, e.g., McGrath v. R.I. Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).
See 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 1; 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 409, § 1.
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 1(a); 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 409, § 1(a).
2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 409, § 1(a)(1)–(2).
Id. §1(a)(3).
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critical infrastructure needs for education, transportation, and
other public projects.”221
The General Assembly continued by “find[ing] and declar[ing]
that it is of critical and immediate public importance that these
public pension programs be restructured” for a variety of
reasons.222 Among the legislature’s articulated reasons behind
RIRSA are: (1) “[t]o ensure that the state [and municipalities] will
be able to provide retirement benefits that will enable our public
employees to enjoy a dignified employment”; 223 (2) “[t]o ensure a
secure and adequate source of retirement funds for public retiree
benefits”;224 and (3) “[t]o ensure that the cost of current and future
benefits is not so great and onerous that it jeopardizes the ability
and obligation of the state and [municipalities] to fund the costs of
[education, sustainable economy, infrastructure, providing needs
to vulnerable citizens, and] other essential programs and
purposes.”225
In the “Legislative intent and findings” section of RIRSA, the
General Assembly concludes by expressly finding and declaring
that the public pension crisis in Rhode Island “ha[d] reached an
emergency stage and must be addressed without delay.”226 Thus,
it appears that the General Assembly identified three broad public
purposes behind RIRSA: (1) ensuring that the public pension
system does not collapse due to the State’s inability to fund it; (2)
a general concern that the State would not have been able to meet
its obligations under its sovereign police power, such as providing
adequate education and maintaining infrastructural integrity,
absent public pension cuts and restructure; and (3) the overall
economic status of the public pension system had reached an
“emergency” level and therefore needed to be addressed. Because
the means of RIRSA are not reasonable and appropriate to
achieving even a legitimate government interest, this Comment
will assume that governmental purpose animating RIRSA is
legitimate for the purpose of further analysis. 227
221. Id. §1(a)(11)–(12).
222. Id. §1(b); id. §1(b)(1)–(4).
223. Id. §1(b)(1).
224. Id. §1(b)(2).
225. Id. §1(b)(1)–(3).
226. Id. §1(b)(4).
227. For arguments challenging the legitimacy of the General Assembly’s
purported public purposes behind RIRSA, see generally M ORRISSEY, supra
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C. Are the Contractual Impairments Reasonable and Necessary in
Light of the Public Purposes Behind RIRSA?
If the court finds a legitimate public purpose behind RIRSA, it
will then determine if the contractual impairment established at
Prong I is reasonable and necessary in light of the public purpose
driving the legislation.228
The General Assembly borrowed
language directly from Contract Clause jurisprudence, concluding
the “Legislative intent and findings” section of RIRSA by declaring
the legislation to be “reasonable and necessary to achieve and
protect the compelling public interests listed [t]herein.”229
note 22. Morrissey argues, inter alia, that Rhode Island’s economic problems
have little to do with public employees currently receiving retirement
benefits, but rather are a result of decades of improper and ineffective
spending by politicians in the State. Id. at 1–2, 7–9. Other commentators,
including Morrissey, have argued that the actuarial numbers used by then
General Treasurer Gina Raimondo in her campaign to drum up public
support for RIRSA are unreliable. See, e.g., id. at 4–9 (critiquing Gina
Raimondo’s “Truth in Numbers” report as false and misleading).
Additionally, a union-backed, financial, forensic investigation of Gina
Riamondo’s handling of the state pension fund has accused Ms. Raimondo of
using public pension reform as a Trojan horse to pull legislative wool over the
public’s eyes and improperly invest public pension money in financially risky
hedge funds with the intent of enriching herself and two venture capitalist
partnerships she formerly managed at the venture capitalist firm, Point
Judith Capital. See Katherine Gregg, Forensic investigation’ financed by
union blasts Raimondo’s handling of R.I. pension fund, PROVIDENCE J., (Oct.
17, 2013, 1:00PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/breaking-news/content/
20131017-forensic-investigation-financed-by-union-blasts-raimondo-s-handlin
g-of-r.i.-pension-fund.ece. Absent a thorough investigation by the Securities
and Exchanges Commission, this author is not prepared to expressly rely on
this argument, but interested readers should see generally Edward “Ted”
Siedle, Rhode Island Public Pension Reform: Wall Street’s License to Steal,
FORBES
INC. (Oct. 18, 2013, 8:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/edwardsiedle/2013/10/18/rhode-island-public-pension-reform-wall-street
s-license-to-steal/. See also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-8-17 (2011) (“[N]o member of
the board . . . shall have any interest, direct or indirect, in the gains or profits
of any investment made by the retirement board.”); 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408,
§ 4, repealing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-8-8.1 (Supp. 2014) (directing the retirement
board to conduct an internal audit on all special pension benefits conferred).
If Governor Raimondo is conclusively found by an independent investigation
to have used RIRSA to enrich herself directly or indirectly through her
previous employer, Point Judith Capital, a reasonable argument can be made
that the articulated public purposes of RIRSA are not “legitimate.”
228. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22, 25
(1977); Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 1999).
229. 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 408, § 1(b)(4).
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Further, the General Assembly applied their own balancing test
and declared that “the achievement of [the aforementioned]
compelling state interests . . . far outweigh[s] any impact that
[RIRSA] might have upon the expectations of active and retired
members of the affected pension systems as to future pensions.”230
Despite the General Assembly’s self-affirmation that it was
justified in repudiating and changing the material terms of its
contractual relationship with public employees, it is the role of the
judiciary to engage in this evaluative analysis, not the legislature.
Challenges that allege legislative impairment of public
contracts to which the state is a party are evaluated with extra
vigilance because the state’s self-interest is at stake, rendering
rational basis deference to the legislature inappropriate. 231 In the
case of RIRSA, the reviewing court will likely be wary of the fact
that the State obviously has a self-interest in avoiding their
financial obligations to public employees, and accordingly, it will
likely review the government’s justifications with a higher degree
of scrutiny then it would if the government had impaired a
contract between two private entities through legislation. 232
While not rising to the level of strict scrutiny, the court applies a
variable degree of scrutiny that is clearly more searching than the
rational basis standard.233
Additionally, a court must consider the “substantiality” of the
contractual impairment established earlier in the Contract Clause
analysis to better frame the analytic inquiry of whether the
impairment was “reasonable and necessary” in light of the State’s
articulated public purpose behind the legislation. 234 Accordingly,
the more substantial the impairment, the more difficult it will be
to conclude that the impairment is reasonable and necessary. 235
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 25–26; McGrath v. R.I.
Ret. Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1996).
232. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 25–26; McGrath, 88 F.3d
at 16. As stated above in note 9, this case, at the time of this writing,
appears to be on the cusp of settlement. A settlement is by no means
determinative on the issue of RIRSA’s constitutionality. Accordingly, the
following argument still has constitutional merit and is styled in as if the
litigation were to continue without settlement.
233. See discussion supra Part II.C.
234. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459
U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983).
235. See, e.g., id.
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Given that the impairments of the contract in question, as
discussed in Section I above, are dire, the means used by RIRSA
must be reasonable in light of their severity.
RIRSA’s means are not reasonable, nor are they necessary.
They radically alter the relationship between the parties without
regard to the effects on retirees and public employees. The
calculus of RIRSA disregards the State’s contractual obligations in
order to secure its bottom-line fiscal budget. While it may be
difficult to balance the State’s budget, the State cannot do so by
trampling the rights of its employees by discharging its
obligations through legislative fiat. The Contract Clause, if it is to
have any meaning at all, must prohibit this action. It is essential
to a system of ordered liberty that governments be constrained by
the organic documents that give them form and authority. The
State of Rhode Island must be so constrained from using drastic
means to achieve its objective of solvency. It must act only in
accordance with the dictates of its Constitution. It must follow the
principle of its Contracts Clause. 236
i. Are the Contractual Impairments Reasonable in Light of the
Public Purposes Behind RIRSA?
Government reform in the abstract is generally accepted as
beneficial for society. There is a presumption that the legislature
will not act unreasonably. Therefore the judiciary will often defer
to the judgment of the elected officials to do what is in the best
interest of society. The issue of public pension reform falls into a
controversial area of legislative utilitarianism, where the
expectation is that the smaller group of public employees will
make an economic sacrifice for the greater good. Indeed, all states
allow for reasonable modification of public pensions to
accommodate changing conditions and to keep the public pension
itself flexible.237 However, at this stage of the Contract Clause
analysis, it is incumbent on the court to protect the public from
overreaching and abusive legislation such as RIRSA.
What constitutes a “reasonable” modification of public
236. To reiterate, for the purposes of this Section, the articulated policy
goals of RIRSA, discussed above at Part. III.B, are presumed to be valid.
237. See Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 40–41; see also
M ONAHAN, supra note 17, at 6.
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employee retirement benefits is not entirely clear. 238 Generally
speaking, the reasonable modification rule states “[t]o be
sustained as reasonable, alterations of employees’ pension rights
must bear some material relation to the theory of a pension
system and its successful operation, and changes in a pension plan
which result in disadvantage to employees should be accompanied
by comparable new advantages.”239 This premise can be broken
up into two elements: (1) whether RIRSA alters pension rights in
a way that relates to the theory of a successful public pension
system; and (2) whether RIRSA appropriately disperses the
benefits of the legislation with the detriments to the infringed
upon public employees.
Despite the stated concern in the “Legislative intent and
findings” section of RIRSA regarding the State’s inability to
provide secure pension benefits in the future without modification
to employees current contributory obligations, there is no
definitive evidence that RIRSA’s massive overhaul of the public
employee retirement system will achieve success. 240 In fact, one
commentator has concluded that elements of RIRSA “actually
increase[] costs to the state and local governments and taxpayers
while making retirement incomes less secure and failing to make
up for the cuts to the [defined benefit] portion of employees’
pensions.”241 While there may be significant debate regarding the
success of defined benefit plans versus defined contribution plans,
it is likely that the increased retirement age and seized COLA
benefits will, on a purely numerical level, undoubtedly contribute
to refunding the pension system. In spite of this, a more
completely funded public pension is not necessarily successful if it
is attained through measures that run contrary to the policy
theories that underpin a contemporary understanding of public
pension benefits.242
238. See Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 40–41.
239. Allen v. City of Long Beach, 287 P.2d 765, 767 (Cal. 1955).
240. See 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 1919–21.
241. HILTONSMITH supra note 21, at 5 (relying on actuarial evaluation of
the Employee’s Retirement System of Rhode Island from June, 30, 2010 to
predict the inefficiency of defined contribution plans).
242. See generally WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING, PENSION
PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 121–34, 176–209, 210–41 (1976) (referencing
specifically Chapter 5 entitled “Public Employee Retirement Plans,” Chapter
8 entitled “Public Policy—Financing Pension Benefits,” and Chapter 9
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Even if a court finds the elements of RIRSA to be reasonably
related to a theory of successful pension operations, the ends do
not justify the means if the detriment imposed on the public
employees is not accounted for by a countervailing benefit to the
burdened class.243 States have adopted two distinct theories on
how to measure a benefit and its corresponding detriment in
evaluating the reasonableness of a public pension modification. 244
The first test considers each individual’s benefit incurred versus
the detriment involved, and the second compares the benefits and
detriments of the group as a whole. 245
Under the first test, the court requires the benefits and
detriments of each individual to be evaluated. 246 Under this
framework, “if one employee experiences a detriment from the
[modification to the pension system], that same employee also
must experience an offsetting benefit” in order for the modification
to be sustained as reasonable. 247 The most obvious case of RIRSA
falling outside of this framework is the retirees who “temporarily”
forfeit their COLAs. It is immaterial if future public employees
enjoy the benefits of a sustainable public pension system as a
result of the detriment placed on retirees, because the burdened
retiree receives no countervailing benefit. 248
“The benefits
experienced by other employees cannot offset the detriment of the
individual employee.”249 The system cannot be reasonable under
the circumstances of its enactment if it accrues all of its benefits to
the state at the zero-sum expense of harm to current employees
and retirees.
Under the second theory of “benefit versus detriment,” the
court will evaluate the benefits and detriments of the public
entitled “Public Policy—Income Objectives and Retirement Ages”).
243. See Allen, 287 P.2d at 767–68.
244. See Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 41.
245. See id.
246. See, e.g., Abbott v. City of L.A., 326 P.2d 484, 489–92 (Cal. 1958)
(exploring the benefits and detriments that the city’s pension modification
had on the plaintiff).
247. Mumford & Leto Pareja, supra note 27, at 41.
248. See id. This argument also logically applies to all current members
of the retirement system as well because they will receive no true benefit
from the detriment of having their COLA permanently reduced. An
argument also can be made for older current public employees in regards to
the increase in retirement age.
249. Id. (citing Abbot, 326 P.2d at 484).
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employees as a whole.250 “[I]f the overall benefit to the employees
as a group offsets the overall detriment to the employees as a
whole, then the change is valid as a reasonable modification.” 251
This utilitarian balancing act forces the court to evaluate the
overall economic policies of the government as opposed to the more
tangible interests of individual parties. It will be exceedingly
difficult for a judge or jury to weigh an elderly retiree’s loss of
COLA benefits for two-and-a-half decades against the
unpredictable benefits to the group of employees as a result of the
reform effort. The court should reject the “group as a whole” test
and instead evaluate the detriments and benefits of the
modifications as they apply to individual classes of employees.
Even if a court does not, the important consideration is the
allocation of benefits and harms. As a whole group, employees are
universally harmed. They receive no benefit whatsoever. They
receive no concession, and the state makes no effort to
accommodate them. They worked, in many cases for decades,
upon the promise of a pension at a value set by the General
Assembly. They retired to find that the General Assembly felt it
appropriate to deny them all the benefits they expected and keep
all savings to itself. This cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a
reasonable modification of a government contract. The severity of
RIRSA is its undoing. There is simply no reasonableness in the
law.
Further, the court may follow the precedent set in United
States Trust Co. of New York and place an emphasis on the
foreseeability
of
the
impairment in
determining the
252
reasonableness of the legislation.
There, the state governments
of New York and New Jersey retroactively repealed a 1962
statutory covenant that provided financial security to holders of
bond issued by the Port Authorities of New York and New
Jersey.253 The states argued that retroactive repeal of the
250. See id.
251. Id. (citing Singer v. City of Topeka, 607 P.2d 467 (Kan. 1980)).
252. 431 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1977). See also id. at 32 (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(explaining that “the State must show that it did not know and could not
have known the impact of the contract on that state interest at the time that
the contract was made” to properly repeal the covenant); Clarke, supra note
85, at 197 (explaining the Court’s “unreasonableness” test in terms of
foreseeability).
253. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 4–14 (detailing the history leading
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covenant was reasonable for the purposes of a Contract Clause
challenge because it occurred as a result of changed
circumstances, namely a shift in the public perception in favor of
public transportation.254
Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, keyed in on the government’s ability to foresee and
anticipate this shift in public perception between the time the
covenant was adopted in 1962 and when it was unilaterally
repealed by the state governments in 1974. 255
Blackmun
concluded that a societal need for public transit had been well
documented and ongoing since 1922, and therefore, the
government should have reasonably expected this ongoing
development.256 He concluded by acknowledging that while the
government could not have foreseen the degree of public concern
for environmental protection and energy conservation that would
exist in 1974, twelve years before the covenant was drafted, these
concerns were, nevertheless, not totally unknown to the
legislature at the time of contracting.257 Therefore, the changed
circumstances were inadequate for the purposes of justifying a
contractual repeal as “reasonable.”258
Chief Justice Burger
underscored this evaluative framework of reasonableness in cases
of government interference with public contract by emphasizing,
in his concurrence, that “the State must show that it did not and
could not have known the impact of the contract on [the State’s
articulated interest at Prong II of a Contract Clause challenge] at
the time that the contract was made.”259
Adopting this framework of foreseeability in order to
determine reasonableness, RIRSA’s contractual impairments are
unreasonable. It should be noted that the requisite course for the
State has always been to simply fund its pension program
adequately. Regardless of whatever economic harms occurred to
the State, the appropriate stance has always been for the State to
ensure adequate funding. It has not done so. It is not reasonable
to apportion the harm of that failure to those who had no say in
up to the repeal of the 1962 covenant).
254. Id. at 29, 32.
255. Id. at 31–32.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 32.
259. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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the degree of funding apportioned to the pension system. It is
foreseeable that pension costs will exist, and they must be met.
The State cannot dodge its obligations by asserting a myopia
about fundamental realities.
In sum, in light of the legislature’s articulated public purposes
behind RIRSA, its modifications are largely unreasonable.
RIRSA, in effect, runs contrary to major theories that underpin a
successful public pension system. An evaluation of the individual
benefits and detriments to public employees reveals a severely
unequitable distribution, particularly to certain individual
members of the retirement system who are retired. Moreover,
even if the assessment of benefits and detriments is taken from a
purely utilitarian, “greater good” perspective, the future benefits
of RIRSA are speculative in nature, and they do not outweigh the
gross burdens suffered by public employees at large. Additionally,
the government could have reasonably foreseen the economic
issues that could flow from underfunded public pension liabilities
at the time it entered into a contract with the employees. The fact
that circumstances changed in the form of the national recession
in the late 2000s to early 2010 is not sufficient to make the
unilateral modification of the entire public pension system
“reasonable” for the purposes of a Contract Clause analysis.
Given the heightened degree of judicial scrutiny at this prong of
the analysis, a court would likely conclude that RIRSA’s
impairments are unreasonable in light of any of the legislature’s
previously stated public purposes.
ii. Are Contractual Impairments Necessary in Light of the Public
Purposes behind RIRSA?
Even if a court were to find the contractual impairments
imposed by RIRSA to be reasonable in light of the government’s
public purpose, the court would still be required to evaluate if the
impairments were necessary to achieve that purpose. 260
Questions of necessity in this sphere can be considered on two
levels: (1) whether the legislative impairment as presented is
essential in order to achieve the public purpose behind the
260. See, e.g., id. at 28–29 (majority opinion); Nat’l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode
Island ex rel. Scigulinsky v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Emps. Ret. Sys., 890 F. Supp.
1143, 1162–64 (D.R.I. 1995).
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legislation; and (2) whether less burdensome alternative means
were available to achieve similar policy goals. 261 Under this
analytic framework, RIRSA and all the impairments that it
prescribed were not necessary to achieve the legislature’s goals of
maintaining a sustainable public pension fund in the future and
ensuring that the State has the economic resources available to
meet its obligations to the general citizenry under its police
power.262
The first inquiry in determining the necessity of the
legislation in the face of impairment requires the court to evaluate
if the impairment is essential in order to achieve the public
purpose behind the legislation. 263 In order for RIRSA to be
“essential,” the court must determine that the government could
not have achieved its purported policy ends without the
modifications imposed by RIRSA. 264 In doing so, the court is to
consider if less drastic contractual modifications could have been
employed to achieve the RIRSA’s desired effect. 265
Through this lens, RIRSA is not essential to achieve the
stated policy goals of protecting the pension system from collapse
due to underfunding. As already discussed, it is well settled that
a legislature may make reasonable changes to public pension
systems to accommodate legislative flexibility and account for
changing circumstances.
By contrast, RIRSA represents an
unprecedented and overly ambitious model for public pension
reform in both scope and degree. Even if deemed reasonable,
RIRSA cannot be seen as essential for the purposes of establishing
“necessity.”
Public pension reform can take many shapes to achieve the
self-preservationist policy goals intended to maintain the solvency
of a public pension system. Stuart Buck, in his 2012 article The
Legal Ramifications of Public Pension Reform, identifies seven
individual modifications to public pension plans that could
presumably achieve the goals of more sustainably maintaining the

261. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 29–30.
262. See discussion of legitimate public purposes behind RIRSA above in
Part III.B.
263. See U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 29–30.
264. See id. at 30.
265. See id.
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economic feasibility of the public pension system.266 The General
Assembly did not choose to implement one individual reformatory
modification of the public pension system, but rather it
implemented an amalgamation of nearly all of pension reform
tactics discussed by Buck.267 RIRSA could be whittled down to a
reasonable public pension reform structure and, very likely,
substantially achieve the policy goal of maintaining a workable
and solvent public pension system. 268 Similarly, the harshness of
the modifications in RIRSA could be significantly reduced and still
presumably lead to a more financially stable and digestible public
pension reform structure.269 Therefore, it is difficult to conclude
that the scope and degree of contractual impairments imposed by
RIRSA’s various pension reform elements, as it stands, were
essential to achieve any legitimate policy goal of the legislature.
At this stage of the Contract Clause analysis, the court will
also consider any “less restrictive alternatives” to RIRSA. 270 In so
doing, the court will consider the availability of alternative means
that could have achieved the legislature’s purported policy ends
without impairing the government’s financial obligations to its

266. Buck, supra note 6, at 67–88 (discussing: (a) Contribution Increases,
(b) COLA Reductions, (c) Changing the Multiplier, (d) Changing What
Components of Compensation Are Included, (e) Changing the Averaging
Period, (f) Changing the Retirement Age, and (g) Converting to a Different
Pension System Entirely). Buck’s central focus seems to be on the logical
concept of “pro-rating” employment benefits for the purposes of avoiding
arbitrary and unfair reform practices. See id. at 69–70. While he applauds
some of the more mathematically creative reformatory elements of RIRSA as
being consistent with this pro-rating principle, he ultimately assesses each
individual reform in its own insular universe and fails to realistically
consider RIRSA as a whole, as that legislation implements nearly all of his
suggested reforms in some capacity at once rather than as separate reforms.
See id. at 74–80.
267. See id. at 67–88.
268. Note that the individual categories of pension reform discussed by
Buck might carry their own constitutional implications. See id. at 67–88; see
also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 30 n.28 (declining to evaluate whether
any lesser impairments acknowledged by the Court would be constitutional).
269. Namely, the suspension of COLA benefits to retirees appears outside
of the regulatory modifications recommended by Buck, who appears to be a
strong proponent of legislative reform of public pensions. Buck, supra note 6,
at 71–74 (recommending a pro-rata approach to COLA reductions and
neglecting to speak to RIRSA’s retiree COLA seizure).
270. See U.S Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 30–31.
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public employees.271 Certainly, alternatives to RIRSA exist for
the purposes of maintaining a financially solvent pension system
that are both evident and more moderate than the unprecedented
restructure of employee benefits prescribed by that statute.
The government maintains substantial financial autonomy to
divert any number of revenues into the public pension system for
the purposes of protecting that system and providing a dignified
retirement for future retirees.272 For example, under its taxing
power, the government maintains the ability to fully fund the
pension system through public tax increases.273 While such an
alternative may be politically toxic, it remains a viable option to
defaulting on financial obligations aimed at a particularized class
of employees. In a similar vein, the government is free to cut costs
to programs that it owes no obligation to under contract. Again,
while this is not an ideal task, the government acknowledged that
meeting this compelling interest would not be easy. 274 If the
government is compelled to engage in pension reform to seemingly
save the public employees from themselves, it must be prepared to
use any and all available means to reach that end. In this case,
the government chose a path to financial stability that plainly
impaired its financial obligations to an individualized group of
employees. As this flies in the face of the Contract Clause of the
United States and Rhode Island constitutions, the legislature
rightly must make an alternative, a likely equally difficult choice,
about how to restore economic stability to the pension system in
Rhode Island.
Because RIRSA was not essential to the articulated policy
goals of the legislature, and because less restrictive alternative
means to these policy ends are apparent, RIRSA is not legally
necessary to achieve any legitimate public purpose.
More
moderate courses of action exist in both the realm of reasonable
and controlled public pension reform, as well as in the realm of
271. See id. at 31.
272. 2011 R.I Pub. Laws 1921.
273. See R.I. CONST. art. V I, §§ 12, 17; id. art. XIII, §§ 4–5. While the
Rhode Island Constitution does not expressly deal with the General
Assembly’s taxing power, these articles, read together, reference that power
by implication.
274. See GINA R AIMONDO, TRUTH IN NUMBERS : THE S ECURITY &
S USTAINABILITY OF RHODE ISLAND’S RETIREMENT S YSTEM 2 (2011), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/RI_TIN-WEB-06-1-11.pdf.
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economic state reform on an abstract and general level. The mere
fact that the State chose to target public pensions as the avenue
for economic stability does not thereby render RIRSA reasonable
nor necessary. In spite of the legislature’s self-affirming balancing
tests of RIRSA, the scales of justice tilt in favor of the
unconstitutionality of RIRSA.
iii. Are the Contractual Impairments imposed by RIRSA
Reasonable and Necessary when Viewed Through the Prism of an
Economic “Emergency?”
Perhaps anticipating RIRSA to be insufficiently reasonable
and necessary to pass constitutional muster, the General
Assembly augmented its “Legislative intent and findings” with the
caveat that “the situation currently confronting the State of Rhode
Island’s publically financed pension systems [to have] reached an
emergency stage.”275 The legitimate existence of an emergency is
one of many indicia considered by courts in the evaluation of the
reasonableness and necessity of legislative impairments of
contract.276 A court should remain skeptical to the objectivity of
an emergency declaration, given the innate prejudice imbedded
within legislative impairments of public contracts to which the
State is a party.277 Accordingly, a court should critically evaluate
the severity, foreseeability, and general reasonableness of such an
emergency declaration and juxtapose it against the relative degree
and nature of the impairment imposed by the legislation in order
to effectively evaluate the weight of such a claim at this stage of
the Contract Clause analysis.
The most familiar example of the interplay between
emergencies and the legislative impairment of contract is Home

275. 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 1921 (emphasis added). This express finding
and declaration of an apparent financial emergency by the General Assembly
is of notable significance at the third prong of the Contract Clause analysis
and, therefore, will be addressed separately below.
276. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 420–23
(1934); Cycle Barn, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1203
(W.D. Wash. 2010) (citing Chico’s Pizza Franchises v. Sisemore, 544 F. Supp.
248, 249 (E.D. Wash 1981)).
277. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26
(1977); Md. State Teachers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hughes, 594 F. Supp. 1353, 1360 (D.
Md. 1984).
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Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell.278 There, the Supreme
Court of the United States considered a private Contract Clause
challenge to a Minnesota mortgage law that was passed in the
wake of the Great Depression. 279 The law, among other things,
extended the period of redemption on foreclosed properties and
was to remain in effect “only during the continuance of the
emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935.”280 A creditor
alleged that the law impaired his contractual relationship with a
borrower and, therefore, was repugnant to the federal Contract
Clause.281 Finding a contractual impairment and accepting the
state court’s finding that the legislature did not have any bias in
declaring an emergency, the Court considered state emergency
powers generally and the material elements of the statute to
determine if the impairment was nevertheless reasonable in light
of those circumstances.282 The Court ultimately upheld the
Minnesota law after it concluded that the statutory impairment of
the contract was narrowly tailored in such a way that it was
reasonable in light of the valid emergency. 283
Some commentators have suggested that the factual parallels
between Rhode Island’s pension crisis and the Great Depression
may render the evaluative line of reasoning in Blaisdell applicable
in this case.284 This conclusion is misguided for two primary
reasons: (1) it necessarily relies on the premise that the national
recession, (a) unpredictably precipitated the dire economic
circumstances in Rhode Island leading to its allegedly
unsustainable pension public pension system and (b) the recession
and its impact on Rhode Island is, therefore, on a commensurate
tier of economic emergency as the Great Depression; and (2) it
overlooks the settled differences of appropriate judicial scrutiny
between cases of private contractual impairments and public
contractual impairments to which the State is a party.285
278. 290 U.S. 398.
279. Id. at 415–16, 419.
280. Id. at 417 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Chung, supra note 5, at 707.
281. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 415–16.
282. Id. at 419–27.
283. Id. at 444–48.
284. See, e.g., Buck, supra note 6, at 27, 81, 88–91; Chung, supra note 5,
at 710–12.
285. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 415–16. Blaisdell dealt with a statutory
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Blaisdell does not control because Rhode Island is the victim of
self-inflected economic negligence rather than the unforeseen and
dramatic consequences of the Great Depression. Additionally, the
Rhode Island pension issue involves a dramatic legislative breach
of financial contractual obligation, as opposed to a narrow and
temporary breach of private contract.
As a matter of common sense, every state is aware of the
financial and economic implications of a publically funded pension
system. Rhode Island chose to neglect its obligations to this fund
and set itself up for disaster. A state’s economic mismanagement
does not give rise to a financial emergency. Unlike the Great
Depression, which led to a “nation wide [sic] and world wide [sic]
business and financial crisis [that had] the same results as if it
were caused by flood, earthquake, or disturbance in nature,” the
pension crisis in Rhode Island was more the result of decades of
economic mismanagement than a singular national economic
catastrophe.286 The economic recession of the late 2000s was
precipitated in part by the burst of the housing bubble and the
collapse of the sub-prime mortgage crises.287 Nationally, the
states suffered, but few as badly as Rhode Island. This does not
necessitate the conclusion that Rhode Island’s pension system is
allegedly unsustainable because of a national economic event.
This overlooks the reasonable conclusion that the State’s public
pension system was mismanaged, underfunded, and inherently
flawed for decades. A national economic event simply brought
these flaws into focus.
While this conclusion may justify
reasonable reform, it does not give rise to the government
justifying RIRSA on the grounds of an unprecedented emergency
stemming from pension underfunding.
Even if one were to accept that the Rhode Island pension
crisis was an “emergency,” that is still merely one factor to be
considered in the “reasonable and necessary” analysis discussed in
the preceding sections. Applying the requisite level of scrutiny

impairment of a contractual relationship between a mortgagee-buyer and a
borrower, whereas the challenge to RIRSA involves a case of governmental
self-interest and, thus, heightened scrutiny of the reasonableness of the
impairment. See id.
286. Id. at 423 (quoting Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass ’n, 249 N.W.
334, 340 (1933) (Olsen, J., concurring)).
287. See Chung, supra note 5, at 711.
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prescribed for this stage of a Contract Clause challenge to a public
contract, RIRSA is still both unreasonable and unnecessary. In
the event that the judiciary acknowledges the existence of an
emergency, the government might be able to establish that the
public pension reform was “necessary” to establish economic
stability. However, the broad scope and ambiguous obligations of
RIRSA still render it unreasonable. Specifically, there is a clear
contrast between the narrow statute discussed in Blaisdell and
RIRSA.288
Unlike Blaisdell, where the court relied on the
narrowly tailored, temporary, and conditional private contractual
impairment in conjuncture with an unprecedented economic
emergency in concluding that the impairment was reasonable,
RIRSA has permanent reductions and “suspensions” of benefits for
indeterminate periods of time. 289 Moreover, RIRSA deals with
public contracts; thus, the court must more intently scrutinize the
government’s position at this prong than did the Supreme Court
in its evaluation of the statute in Blaisdell.290
In conclusion, it is appropriate to review the “emergency”
declared by the General Assembly in RIRSA with a fair degree of
skepticism given its clear self-interest in avoiding its financial
obligations to public employees. 291
A critical look at this
emergency reveals that the public pension crisis does not rise to
the requisite level of “emergency” necessary to serve as a
justification for RIRSA. The economic issues facing Rhode Island
are more likely the result of decades of public pension
mismanagement rather than some unforeseen and dramatic
economic catastrophe. Even accepting the proposition that there
is an economic emergency in Rhode Island, RIRSA still fails to
pass the heightened hurdle of being a reasonable and necessary
means to a legitimate policy end. RIRSA is entirely too broad and
indeterminate to be considered reasonable, even with the added
weight of a legitimate emergency.
While reform might be
necessary in the event that the public pension issue in Rhode
Island has, in fact, crossed the threshold of an “emergency,”
RIRSA cannot be perceived as a reasonable modification. As the

288.
289.
290.
291.

See
See
See
See

290 U.S. at 415–17, 443–46.
id. at 443–46.
id. at 415–16.
U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977).
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contractual impairment must be both necessary and reasonable to
clear this hurdle, RIRSA remains unconstitutional when viewed
through the lens of an alleged “emergency.”
IV. CONCLUSION

“Whether it be in the field of sports or the halls of the
legislature it is not consonant with the American Tradition of
fairness and justice to change the ground rules in the middle of
the game.”292 It is incumbent upon the judiciary to ensure that
American traditions of fairness, equity, and obligation are upheld
when state legislatures attempt to exclude themselves from such
foundational principals. The Contract Clause is the judicial check
on such legislative overreaching and abuse.
RIRSA contains multiple reformatory elements that are
repugnant to the Contract Clause of both the United States and
Rhode Island constitutions, and therefore, the law should be
declared unconstitutional and invalid. The public employees have
a contractual relationship with their employer—the State of
Rhode Island—and thus, are entitled to the benefit of their
bargain and fruits of their performance of a unilateral contract. It
is assumed that the State has a legitimate public purpose
compelling public pension reform; however, elements of RIRSA
substantially impair a contractual relationship with the public
employees of the State in a way that is not reasonable and
necessary in light of the State’s purported public purpose behind
reform.
This is not to say that any type of public pension reform is
unreasonable, unnecessary, or otherwise unconstitutional. States
have, and ought to have, the legislative flexibility to make
reasonable modifications to their public pension systems to
account for changing circumstances. RIRSA, however, is not a
reasonable modification of Rhode Island’s ailing public pension
system. RIRSA is a profoundly ambitious attempt to rectify
Rhode Island’s pension difficulties by placing all the costs of a
solution upon those least able to bear them. The Contract Clause
should not serve as a safety blanket, protecting against any law
that might impair previous contractual relationships with the
292. Secunda, supra note 31, at 263 (quoting Sylvestre v. Minnesota, 214
N.W.2d 658, 665 (Minn. 1973)).
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State. But if the clause is to have any meaning all, it must mean
that the State cannot simply wave its hands and absolve itself of
contracted obligations. The problem is especially more pressing
given the origin of the pension crisis—it is the government of
Rhode Island that created the underfunded pension liabilities that
threaten the State, not the retirees. The Contract Clause must
protect existing public employment retirement benefits from the
massive erosion that RIRSA authorizes.
Although I conclude that RIRSA is unconstitutional, the
public should, as I do, admire and applaud the General Assembly
of Rhode Island and Governor Raimondo for being
uncharacteristically proactive about the economic issues in Rhode
Island.
Unfortunately, the government attempted economic
reform in a way that wrote its own significant contractual
obligations out of the law and, therefore, in violation of the settled
(albeit murky) principles of Contract Clause jurisprudence. This
is not a case of the Rhode Island Constitution disallowing a broad
range of government action. Instead, this is only a check on the
government’s power to abuse its plenary legislative authority to
free itself of responsibility for promises given.
Rhode Island and other states looking to sustainably reform
public pension systems should consider limiting reform to
reasonable and incremental steps that apply only to incoming
workers. This gives the worker the benefit of weighing the
economic risks and benefits of the public-sector before commencing
performance of a unilateral contract. While this does not achieve
the immediate economic result that Rhode Island sought, it
maintains the integrity of contractual obligation in a rational and
constitutional manner that will eventually achieve the desired
result.
The government should not be permitted to write its own
substantial financial obligations out of the law. Obligation and
expectation are baseline principles of fairness that serve as pillars
for organized society. As Friedrich Nietzsche wrote:
. . . To ordain the future in advance . . . man must first
have learned to distinguish necessary events from chance
ones, to think causally, to see and anticipate distant
eventualities as if they belonged to the present, to decide
with certainty what is the goal and what the means to it,
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and in general be able to calculate and compute. Man
himself must first of all have become calculable, regular,
necessary, even in his own image of himself, if he is to be
able to stand security for his own future, which is what
one who promises does!
This precisely is the long story of how responsibility
originated. The task of breeding an animal with the right
to make promises evidently embraces and presupposes as
a preparatory task that one first makes men to a certain
degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and
consequently calculable. 293
If the government acts in a manner inconsistent with this
bedrock concept, it is incumbent on the judiciary to ensure that
the obligation and sanctity of contract law remain intact.

293. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE , GENEALOGY OF M ORALS 58–59 (Walter
Kauffman ed. 1989), available at https://www.princeton.edu/~ereading/
Friedrich%20Nietzsche,%20Second%20EssayGuilt%20Bad%20Conscience%2
0and%20the%20Like.pdf. Credit to Roy Kreitner for brining my attention to
this quote in his book Calculating Promises: The Emergence of Modern
American.
ROY KREITNER, C ALCULATING PROMISES : THE EMERGENCE OF
M ODERN AMERICAN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1974).

